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ABSTRACT
This study extends earlier research by Kreps (1985), Bosworth and 
Kreps (1986), Saunders and Kreps (1987), and Mooney (1989). Kreps 
represents organizing with a taxonomy of structural elements: domains
(D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A). The paradox of social 
action and social order are seen as basic to organizing and role 
enactment. Mooney expanded Kreps' original methodology for examining 
organizing and role enactment, and applied that methodology to twenty-nine 
emergent disaster response organizations. Her research illustrated the 
need to examine social roles both as parts of organizations and as unique 
structural dimensions.
The present study re-examines 52 organizations characterized as 
emergent by Saunders and Kreps (1987) , this time with the goal of a 
further understanding of the role enactments of individual organization 
members. The data for each organization participant come from the 
Disaster Research Center archives at the University of Delaware. Mooney's 
methodology has been revised to improve the measurement of individual 
role enactment. The three criterion originally used by Bosworth and Kreps 
attempt to distinguish dimensions of role, specifically role-playing and 
role-making, and degrees of role innovation. As an addition to Kreps's 
research program, this study adds to the understanding of individual role 
performances in the disaster context. It also serves as a complement to 
Mooney's research. Mooney examined the complexities of organization, 
while the present study examines the complexities of role. A comparison 
of Mooney's and the present methodology, and the extensions made in the 
latter method, provide necessary groundwork for those studying role 
enactment during the emergency period of disasters.
ROLE ENACTMENT AND DISASTER RESPONSE 
A METHODOLOGICAL EXPLORATION
INTRODUCTION
The concepts of role and organization are two of the most studied 
and yet perplexing concepts within the disciplines of psychology and 
sociology. The ongoing research of Kreps and his associates presents an 
attempt to crystallize an understanding of these concepts relative to 
their positions within the context of social structure. Bosworth arid 
Kreps (1986) see the problems of action and order as the foundation for 
the development of a theory of organization and role. Combining the 
relevant literature concerning both of these concepts, each of which has 
its own distinct theories, is as difficult and complex as it is 
interesting, particularly within the context of Kreps's research.
Kreps has developed an integrated framework concerning role and 
organization that he applies to disaster organizations. Mooney, an 
associate of Kreps's, has recently concluded research on the role 
enactment that takes place in the form of role-making and role-playing 
within organizations that emerge in response to disaster events. Mooney 
began with data from 52 ephemeral organizations that emerged in response 
to 12 natural disasters. These organizations were a part of an original 
data set that was used by Bosworth and Kreps in 1986. The data come from 
the Disaster Research Center archives at the University of Delaware. 
It has been suggested that established organizations, those existing 
prior to the disaster event, might be more order-based, while emergent
3organizations, those whose life histories are circumscribed by the event, 
might be more action-based (Turner, 1989). By examining the role 
enactment within emergent organizations separately from established 
organizations, Mooney's research hoped to isolate differences of action 
and order between established and emergent organizations.
Of the original 52 emergent organizations used by Kreps, Mooney was 
able to use 29 for detailed organizational examinations. The present 
research is designed to extend the work of Mooney. Rather than examining 
the emergent organizations themselves, the focus will be on the 
individual incumbents participating in this type of organization. 
Incumbents are defined as participating members of Kreps's original 52 
emergent organizations who give information in their interviews that 
pertains to their own role performance in the disaster response.
I will proceed by discussing organization within structure, a 
necessary discussion in that it explains the connections of the present 
research with the ongoing research of Kreps and his associates. I will 
then consider role within social structure, noting the important aspects 
of the concepts that have been used by Mooney and that will be used in 
the present study for empirical application. To conclude the literature 
review, organization and role will be discussed in terms of Kreps's 
research program.
The next section, "A Methodology of Role", will outline the specific 
method by which I will examine role enactment in the emergent disaster 
response organizations. Three of Kreps' original criteria, as well as 
information concerning the leadership of specific incumbents, will be 
described. By first describing the method used by Mooney, the important
changes in the present method will be made more clear. The significance 
of these changes will be discussed in terms of their implications for 
the general study of role within and distinct from organization. It will 
be shown that methodological differences do affect the data, and 
therefore clear distinctions are essential for the examination of such 
fundamental concepts as role.
Case studies will be presented in the "Findings" section, and will 
clarify further the distinctions that were set out during the discussion 
of the methodology. Cases that presented unique problems in the preseht 
study will be discussed. Differences between the way that they were 
described by Mooney and by myself will be highlighted in order to 
demonstrate significant methodological distinctions, as well as research 
implications. Along with these case studies I will describe the general 
differences between the two data sets.
This extension of Mooney's research hopefully will complete our 
understanding of organization and role enactment in these emergent 
disaster organizations. In addition, the methodology presented as a part 
of these research efforts is significant in itself because it provides 
a new and unique way to examine the concept of role scientifically. 
Finally, a comparison of the two methodologies, one with an 
organizational and one with an individual focus, hopefully will clarify 
the differences between these two approaches, and will enable future 
researchers to develop more sound methods and conceptions of role.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Organization
How do the problems of action and order relate to Kreps's research?
Alexander argues that the problems of action and order are the two
fundamental questions that social scientists must face in their
theoretical endeavors (1982). Bosworth and Kreps also concern themselves
with these two problems, although their definitions vary from those used
by Alexander. They write:
The problem of action is one of determining how social units are 
created and sustained by individual thoughts and behaviors. The 
problem of order is one of determining how individual thoughts and 
behaviors are shaped and controlled by social units (1986: 699),
They see these problems as a paradox, one best approached through
dialectical thinking. Aday clarifies the meaning of dialectic by
sugge s t ing that:
-there is an order or organization;
-the order consists of parts that stand in a relationship to one 
another and to the whole that is both complementary and 
contradictory;
-the order is greater than and different from the sum or 
collection of the parts;
-the order of organization has both objective and subjective 
qualities; and
-the order is dynamic; that is, it is temporary and always changing 
or subject to change as a result of the complementary and 
contradictory relationships among the parts (1989).
Bosworth and Kreps' research examines both organization and role in terms
of action and order; they believe that this approach will better enable
these concepts to act as expressions of social structure. I will discuss
6the relation of action and order to Kreps's research after giving a brief 
summary of his theoretical framework.
Kreps's research involves the examination of disaster response 
organizations. He has developed a structural code of four elements that 
are "individually necessary and collectively sufficient for organization 
to exist" (1985:51). The emergence of the four elements, domains (D), 
tasks (T) , resources (R) , and activities (A) , suggests four stages in 
organizational development. Kreps has developed a taxonomy of these 
elements, suggesting that there are 64 possible forms with 24 forms of 
actual organizations. A clear understanding of Kreps's theoretical 
foundations is needed; I will outline Kreps's ideas below.
As mentioned above, Bosworth and Kreps define organization by the
existence of four elements (1986). He, with Bosworth, writes that
"Domains (D) and tasks (T) are structural ends of organization.
Resources (R) and activities (A) are structural means. Means-ends
relationships involving (D), (T) , (R) , and (A) reveal organization as
ever emerging and changing" (1986:700). The structural code is created
from the letters of the elements of the taxonomy. In order to provide
the reader with a full understanding of the meanings that are associated
with these four elements, I refer directly to Bosworth and Kreps's
article in which their definitions are spelled out. As a member of their
continuing research program, it is vital that I maintain consistency with
their work. In light of this, I will quote their definitions verbatim:
Domains (D) are collective representations of bounded units and 
their reasons for being (Durkheim, 1938). In the circumstance of 
disaster, domains translate actual or threatened impacts as spheres 
of collective action which distinguish direct participants from all 
others. Stated or written in communications at the boundaries of 
those spheres of action, domains identify organization as open
7system that has power and external legitimacy (Thompson, 1967). 
Tasks (T) are collective representations of a division of labor for 
the enactment of human activities (Durkheim, 1933). As such, they 
are vocabularies of collective action which give it focus and 
interdependence (March and Simon, 1958). Stated or written in 
communications of those who enact them, tasks identify organization 
as closed system that has power and internal legitimacy (Thompson, 
1967). As things, domains and tasks are independent and may precede 
or follow each other in the unfolding of organization. Resources 
(R) are individual capacities and collective technologies of human 
populations (Durkheim, 1933; Weber, 1968; Lenski and Lenski, 1982). 
Widely varying in both kind and quantity, resources provide 
objective and subjective requisites of collective action
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Gamson et al, 1972). Their presence in 
a process as things comes to be defined with reference to domains 
and tasks. However, their mobilization may precede or follow either 
of them. Activities (A) are the conjoined actions of individuals 
and social units (Alihan, 1938; Hawley, 1950). As things, 
activities both enable and are constrained by domains, tasks, and 
resources (1986:700).
Bosworth and Kreps note three important characteristics of this 
structural code. First, each element expresses social structure in its 
own manner. Second, when all four elements are co-present, organization 
exists. Finally, there is no assumed pattern in their order or 
arrangement. This implies that "all logically possible combinations and 
permutations of the elements are expressed taxonomically as forms of 
association (Kreps, 1985)" (1986:700). From these four elements are 
derived the possibility of 64 potential forms of association (Table 1). 
The table shows 4 one-element forms, 12 two-element forms, 24 three- 
element forms, and 4 four-element forms, 64 total. Kreps proposes that 
only the 24 four-element forms are complete organizations because they 
alone include each of the four 
elements.
It is at this point that the paradox of action and order re-enters 
the discussion. This structural code and its taxonomy can be used to
TABLE 1: Taxonomy of Forms of Association
Organizational_________Three___________ Two___________One
 Forms_______________ Element________Element______ Element
D-T-R-A (Order) D-T-R D-T D
D-T-A-R D-T-A D-R T
D-R-A-T D-R-A D-A R
D-R-T-A D-R-T T-R A
D-A-T-R D-A-T T-A
D-A-R-T D-A-R T-D
T-R-A-D T-R-A R-A
T-R-D-A T-R-D R-D
T-A-D-R T-A-D R-T
T-A-R-D T-A-R A-D
T-D-R-A T-D-R A-T
T-D-A-R T-D-A A-R
R-A-D-T R-A-D
R-D-T-A R-D-T
R-D-A-T R-D-A
R-T-D-A R-T-D
R-T-A-D R-T-A
A-D-T-R A-D-T
A-D-R-T A-D-R
A-T-D-R A-T-D
A-T-R-D A-T-R
A-R-D-T A-R-D
A-R-T-D (Action) A-R-T
9understand the tension between action and order within organizations. 
Bosworth and Kreps suggest that there is an action-order continuum 
inherent in their taxonomy. The D-T-R-A form suggests the order end of 
the continuum, while the A-R-T-D form suggests the action end. Depending 
on the element form, each organization can be characterized by its 
relative position on the action-order continuum (again, Table 1).
It is important to keep in mind what Kreps terms "the dialectic
of social structure" (1985:54), by which he refers to both the autonomy
and the unity of action and order. He suggests that social order implies
identifiable units which constrain human action; however, these very
units are constantly being changed by individual human actors. This is
the order approach to the paradox. The action approach would suggest
that human action implies identifiable actors who change social units;
however, any such change always takes place within some structural
context. Kreps suggests that, regardless of an organization's structure
in terms of his taxonomy, both action and order will be present.
Before he conceptualized the action-order continuum, Kreps had
taken the structural code and made it even more explicit with the
development of a metric (1985). It enables him to represent numerically
each point along the continuum (Table 2). When he later developed the
action-order continuum, he recognized that it helps to illustrate more
concretely each organization's tendency towards action or order. The
metric is described in this way:
The key requirement for constructing the metric is to capture all 
of the transitivities between D-T-R-A or social order and A-R-T-D 
or social action. This is done in the following way: At the social
order end of the continuum D precedes T, R and A (3 points) ; T 
precedes R and A (2 points); and R precedes A (1 point). Given one 
point for each conforming transitivity (3+2+1), D-T-R-A receives a
TABLE 2: Organizational Forms:
Social Order/Social Action Metric
Organizational Logical Number of
Forms Metric Forms
D-T-R-A +3 1
D-T-A-R
D-R-T-A
T-D-R-A
+2 3
D-R-A-T
D-A-T-R
T-R-D-A +1 5
T-D-A-R
R-D-T-A
D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-A-D-R
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
A-D-T-R
0 6
T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T
R-T-A-D -1 5
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R
R-A-T-D
A-T-R-D -2 3
A-R-D-T
A-R-T-D -3 1
Total: 24
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score of six, while at the social action end of the continuum, 
A-R-T-D receives a score of zero. Beginning at the social action 
end would simply reverse the scores, but not change the distribution 
in any way. By subtracting a constant 3 from each derived level of 
social order or social action, the resulting metric is +3 to -3 with 
a 0 midpoint (Bosworth and Kreps, 1986: 703).
This metric numerically depicts the tension between social action and
social order, giving each organization a score that enables the
researcher to judge whether it is more action or more order oriented,
while always keeping in mind the dialectic of social structure.
Role
Bosworth and Kreps also recognize that role, like organization, is 
important for the understanding of social structure. While Mooney's 
research focused on organization, the present study will continue with 
an examination of role within social structure. Role is also approached 
dialectically by conceiving of it as composed of both action and order. 
Bosworth and Kreps suggest that the action perspective emphasizes the 
individual and role-making, while the order perspective emphasizes the 
unit, or collective, and role-playing (1986). It is important to 
understand the differences between role-making and role-playing; this 
next section briefly explores these differences.
It was in 1934 that Jacob Moreno first proposed the idea of 
role-playing as it related to the idea of role-taking. He suggested that 
role-taking referred to a finished, complete role that an individual 
would take on and imitate. Role-taking was seen by Moreno as "an 
attitude already frozen in the behavior of the person". He contrasted 
this idea with role-playing, a concept he viewed as "an experimental
12
procedure, a method of learning to perform roles more adequately” 
(Moreno, 1960:84). He viewed role-playing as an act, or the act of
experimenting and playing-out new and different roles. Role-taking, on 
the other hand, was viewed as a more static process, one in which the 
person simply acted out a given role.
Moreno went on to write that these were not two different or 
opposing ideas, but two different frames of reference, or approaches to 
the concept of how persons enact their roles. He believed that the idea 
of role-taking was too static, and that his concept of role-playirtg 
conceptualized better the idea of a person's role performance in a 
constantly changing environment. He believed that the world is
constantly changing, and that new roles are constantly emerging, while 
old roles are being discarded. He also believed that within specific 
societies, different ethnic and social groups struggle for dominance, and 
the roles of the dominant group become the dominant roles for the rest 
of society. When the dominant group changes, many of the dominant roles 
change as well.
It is therefore from Moreno that a dynamic concept of role 
performance, specifically in his terms role-playing, originates. When 
role-playing, actors practice the roles that they see performed by others 
in their social group. This is the very basis of learning; as the actor 
gains knowledge of the other persons' roles, he also gains a knowledge 
of the other persons' situations (Biddle, 1979). Turner suggests also 
that role- playing is the "overt enactment of what one conceives to be 
one's own appropriate role in a given situation" (1966:151). This 
relates to Biddle's idea of gaining knowledge of others' situations
13
because it is only by understanding the situations of others that a 
person can understand his own appropriate position in a social situation.
The concept of role-making is related to and derived from the 
concept of role-playing. Rosenberg and Turner write that role-playing 
basically concerns adaptation to the expectations of others, which 
suggests that this adaptation guides social interaction. They write that 
roles, therefore, exist independently for every actor since they are used 
spontaneously and are changed and adjusted in interaction. Role-playing 
is simply conformity, and deviation from existing roles would be 
disorganization. They conclude that in playing roles, people are also 
making roles as they modify and create new roles within interaction 
(1981).
In situations of role conflict, persons may not only choose a role, 
but they have the ability to develop a new, third role (Rosenberg and 
Turner, 1981). This development of a role which is totally new and 
distinct from all of the other past roles in their repertoire involves 
role-making. Vander Zanden phrases this idea well when he writes that 
the continuing creation of roles while role-playing entails role-making, 
and that role- making occurs when a person is faced with trying to 
balance multiple roles that have conflicting and contrasting demands 
(1987).
Role-making can also be related to role-taking. Turner suggests this 
when he discusses the idea that actors take roles, but often in the 
process they modify them. In this situation the actors are both 
role-taking and role-making (1962). It is also important to realize that 
role-taking was originally role-making. Individuals are not simply born
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with roles; role-taking may imply an individual acting out a completed, 
static role, but this does not mean that he always had command of that
role. At one point or another, individuals must make all of the roles
that they eventually turn to when role-taking (Moreno, 1960).
The three concepts of role-taking, role-playing, and role- making 
are very similar and interrelated. There are precise distinctions among 
them, but the concepts often seem to collapse upon one another. It is 
important for social scientists to keep the overlaps and distinctions in 
mind. Role-taking suggests the acting out of a finished or completed
role, role-playing suggests freedom in the acting and manipulating of
roles, and role-making implies a high degree of freedom to create and 
reconstruct roles (Moreno, 1960).
Kreps ' Research Program: Organization and Role
Bosworth and Kreps have developed a set of four criteria for making 
judgments about role-making and role-playing in their research on 
disaster organizations (1986). They call their first criterion 
"inconsistency versus consistency of status/role nexus":
The focus here is perhaps the most conventional structural 
conception of role (Linton, 1936; Handel, 1979). Status is a 
socially recognized category of actors. As such it serves as a 
constraint on individual behavior. To some degree, therefore, 
social expectations shape the actions of and toward positionally 
labeled individuals. These expectations are referred to as roles. 
Inconsistency implies a redefinition of appropriate behavior 
(role-making dominates), while consistency suggests an understood 
status/role connection (role-playing dominates) (p.705).
The main issue with this first criterion is the consistency of the
status/role over pre- and post-disaster periods.
The second criterion is "discontinuity versus continuity of role
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linkages" (p.705), and has to do with the relational dimension of role. 
If several roles of the post-disaster period are not linked before the 
disaster event, role-making is evident because new role relationships 
need to be formed by the participating individuals. If roles are linked 
both before and after the disaster, role-playing is evident. It is also 
important to note that if there is a mix of discontinuous and continuous 
relationships, neither role-making nor role-playing is dominant.
The third criterion is that of "unique role performance versus role 
boundary expansion" (p.705). Voluntarism is the important concept with 
this criterion.
Role-making dominates when no collective representation of role 
enactment exists at a given stage. An example would be spontaneous 
search and rescue by individuals who happen to be in or near a 
heavily damaged area. Role-playing dominates when such
representation does exist. An example would be search and rescue 
at this same site by anyone having relevant training. Both unique 
role performance and role boundary expansion imply a contradiction. 
The latter may involve innovativeness (Turner, 1980), but 
expectations of action give it focus. The former is the purer form 
of creativity, yet it is driven by ultimate values (e.g., altruism). 
Evidence of both unique performance and role boundary expansion 
indicates that neither role-making nor role-playing dominates 
(p.705).
Bosworth and Kreps originally described a fourth criterion for 
making judgments concerning role-making and role-playing, that of
"homogeneity versus heterogeneity of roles" (p.705). This criterion will 
be excluded from my research because of a "possible tautology between the 
task element and this criterion" (Turner, 1988; Mooney, 1989:15).
In order to measure role-making and role-playing, Bosworth and 
Kreps developed a method to score each criterion. This method is
important to note for the present study; in itself it will not be a part 
of the actual measurement process, but it is from this method that the
16
present measurement was developed:
Inconsistency of pre- and post-disaster status/role nexus: 
l=inconsistency of pre- and post-disaster status/role nexus, 
role-making dominates 
2=mix of inconsistent and consistent pre- and post-disaster 
status/role nexus 
3=consistency of pre- and post-disaster status/role nexus, 
role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
Discontinuity versus continuity of pre- and post-disaster role 
linkages:
l=discontinuity of pre- and post-disaster role linkages, 
role-making dominates 
2=mix of discontinuity and continuity of pre- and post­
disaster role linkages 
3=continuity of pre- and post-disaster role linkages, 
role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
Unique role performance versus boundary expansion: 
l=unique role performance, role-making dominates 
2=mix of unique role performance and role boundary expansion 
3=role boundary expansion, role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain (Mooney, 1989:17)
It can be seen that role-making will always be scored as one,
role-playing as three, and any mixes will be designated by a two. The
scores of all criteria can be totaled, creating a range of scores from
3 (score=l for all criteria) to 9 (score=3 for all criteria). Each
organization can be described numerically in terms of its level of
role-making or role-playing. This method illustrates the basis of
subsequent research. It has been reconceptualized in terms of the actual
measurement, but this scoring method does indicate the type of
conclusions that Mooney and I aim to draw in our research.
At this point I believe that I have summarized the current research 
that is being done by Bosworth and Kreps. It is all completely relevant 
to the proposed research because it will be the methodological basis for
17
my studies. What follows is a description of the present research and 
how it relates to work by Bosworth and Kreps's, and particularly how it 
balances Mooney's research.
A METHODOLOGY FOR ROLE ANALYSIS
Ralph Turner, a leading role theorist, has praised and criticized
Bosworth and Kreps's methods for examining role-making and role-playing.
In their original research, they examined 423 organizations that acted
in response to 16 different natural disasters. Their data on these cases
come from the Disaster Research Center archives. Each case involves one
or more interviews with organization members, who are treated as
informants. There are 1062 total individual interviews from the original
423 organizations. Bosworth and Kreps examined 39 of these organizations
in their original research (1986). They chose cases that were "midpoint
cases" on the metric in order to control a balance between action and
order. Turner's criticism is that of the 423 organizations, only 52 were
emergent; that is, they did not exist as organizations before the
disaster event. Turner argues that the overwhelming dominance of already
existing organizations might bias the research towards role-playing, or
the order end of the continuum.
Turner implies that action (and role-making) may be dominant in
emergent organizations, and order (and role-playing) may be dominant in
existing organizations. For these reasons, he believes that this
difference should be made distinct (1986). In their response to Turner,
Bosworth and Kreps write:
It may have been a mistake to begin our role studies on a sample of 
both established and emergent organizations. It will be possible 
in the future to create subsamples of only established or emergent
19
organizations and then compare correlations of organizing and 
role-playing across the two samples. This would partially respond 
to Turner's position and could provide new insights about 
organization and role (1989:219).
This is where the work of Mooney and my proposed research become 
important. Following this criticism, Mooney began thesis work on the 
52 emergent disaster organizations. As has been mentioned earlier, some 
changes were made in Bosworth and Kreps's methods, and Mooney began 
applying their conception of organization and role as social structure 
specifically to the emergent cases within their original sample. One of 
the four role-making/role-playing criteria was dropped; the remaining 
three were made more specific. All three criteria were expanded. Mooney 
also changed the measuring technique used by Bosworth and Kreps:
The archival data do not clearly indicate what all
participants within a given organization are doing at all times. 
Bosworth and Kreps (1986) therefore try to make judgments of a mix 
when the data do not clearly reveal whether participants within the 
organization under study are engaging in more role-playing or more 
role-making. To correct for this, the second change mentioned above 
involves altering the measurement technique only. With the
exception of the third criterion, the actual criteria will remain 
the same as in the original study, but here the effort will be to 
show more precisely the proportions of participants engaging in 
role-making or role-playing. Thus, rather than indicating the score 
as the general mixed category used in the original, it is determined 
for each role enacted, to what degree role-playing or role-making 
is occurring, in order to provide much more precise measurements 
(Mooney, 1989:22).
I will now outline the specific methodology that has been developed
by Mooney and that I will extend. The focus of the research is on the
role enactment process within the context of organization for Mooney, and 
within the context of role in the present study; the use of the three 
criteria are the main elements of the methodology. First, the concept 
of role incumbent should be defined as it is used in these studies. The
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word "incumbent" is used in reference to the individual members of the 
disaster organizations. Several incumbents may play one role. The word 
"role" is used to refer to a specific role that is being enacted in the 
organization, not specific individuals. Mooney's codebook (Appendix A) 
and the codebook used for the present research (Appendix B) will 
illustrate the methodology that is described below.
A section has been added to the present methodology, one titled 
"personal biography". Because this study examines individual 
respondents, I hope that more can be learned about the specific 
individuals and their disaster involvement. When known, each 
respondent's age, gender, marital status, residence and length of time 
at residence are recorded. In hopes of learning about the motivation for 
participating in disaster response, I will record any disaster 
experience, whether the respondent was a victim in the disaster, and what 
seemed to be the primary motivating factor for his involvement. I will 
also note how long the respondents participated in the disaster response. 
This information may add to our understanding of what people become 
involved in disaster response groups and why.
The final section of Mooney's methodology involved determining which 
incumbents are leaders, and examining this leadership in relation to 
boundary-spanning roles. The leadership role was determined to be either 
instrumental or expressive. Then, each leader was examined in terms of 
his or her internal or external boundary-spanning role. Internal 
spanning involved linking roles within an organization, while external 
spanning involved linking the organization with other organizations or 
groups. Kreps and Mooney hypothesized that leadership roles may be
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related to boundary-spanning roles in some way. Finally, Mooney noted 
whether there was conflict in the development of the organization's 
leadership.
The present methodology is somewhat different in terms of the 
leadership examination. Each respondent's possible role as an 
instrumental leader and an expressive leader is noted. The
boundary-spanning section has been dropped from this part of the 
methodology because it is more clearly outlined by the incumbent external 
link analysis of the second criterion.
It is important to note that leadership can be conceived as external 
to an incumbent's organization or completely internal. The present 
study, as well as Mooney's, made judgments only on leadership that was 
internal to the organization; those who were leaders of the group. 
Neither method accounts for leadership that projects from the group to 
others. In some disaster response organizations it seems that every 
member is a "leader" when considering the affected community as a whole, 
but only the leaders within the organization itself are noted.
The section on leadership conflict has been slightly changed. 
Rather than limiting the conflict to the leadership development, I note 
any conflict that might occur within the leadership at any time during 
the organization's existence. Also, any conflict is distinguished as 
having occurred in a sub- unit of the organization, in the overall 
organization, or in both. I also have noted separately whether or not 
the incumbent was a leader, whether or not leaders experienced conflict 
in their own leadership, and whether there was conflict in the 
organizational leadership as a whole, regardless of whether or not the
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incumbent was a leader.
What remains is the discussion of the three criteria. Each has been 
altered for the present study. As the foundation of the methodology, I 
have separated each for its discussion.
Criterion One
Mooney began the examination of the first criterion, 1 inconsistency 
versus consistency of status/role nexus", by determining and listing all 
of the roles that exist in a given organization. All of the
post-disaster roles were listed, and then the roles were divided into
their incumbents. The incumbents were then listed in terms of a major 
pre-disaster role. The pre-disaster role was defined in terms of the
incumbent's primary occupational role. The number of consistent and
inconsistent roles pre- and post-disaster could then be determined, as 
well as the number of incumbents enacting consistent and inconsistent 
roles pre- and post-disaster. This allowed the researcher to determine 
if there had been consistency or inconsistency in the status role nexus. 
Consistency would indicate role-playing, and inconsistency would indicate 
role- making.
A category was added to the first criterion that includes 
non-occupational roles. It was added because of unclear situations 
concerning other possible relevant roles in incumbents' repertoires, such 
as that of members of the National Guard. Being a member of the National 
Guard would not be an incumbent's primary occupational role, although 
they do get paid. It would be incorrect to note only their primary 
occupational role, and suggest that it is inconsistent with the role that
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they would perform as National Guardsmen following a disaster. 
Guardsmen have been trained for at least some of the work that they 
perform during disasters, and therefore their roles could be consistent 
regardless of pre-disaster occupation. Thus, I created two categories, 
’’secondary occupational role", and "primary nonoccupational role", which 
was added for further clarity, indicating situations in which a primary 
role is relevant to the disaster involvement, although it may not be an 
occupation.
For the present research, the first criterion will be changed to 
consider only the consistency of the pre- and post- disaster roles of 
each respondent. I will make basic judgments about the consistency of 
incumbents' post-disaster roles with their occupational roles, their 
secondary occupational roles, and any possible primary nonoccupational 
roles. In several cases incumbents played several different roles as 
members of one organization. In cases such as these a judgment was made 
as to which role was the primary post-disaster role, and this role was 
used consistently throughout the methodology as the basis for all 
judgments concerning role enactment.
Criterion Two
In the second criterion, "discontinuity versus continuity of role 
linkages", the role relationships were examined. In Mooney's work, all 
post-disaster roles of an organized response were assumed to be linked 
structurally, and so were all incumbents performing these roles. This 
criterion asked: 1. how many post-disaster incumbent pairs are
structurally linked by pre-disaster occupational roles, and 2. how many
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post-disaster role pairs are structurally linked by pre-disaster 
occupational roles.
Once these questions were answered, Mooney was able to determine any 
connections or linkages between each incumbent, and each role in terms 
of its incumbents. By determining if incumbent pairs and role pairs were 
connected, or continuous, the researcher would be able to conclude that 
role-playing exists. In the same manner, by determining that role pairs 
were discontinuous, the researcher could conclude that role-making 
exists.
An example that Mooney (1989) gives from the second criterion 
involves the roles of funeral director and clerical worker. In the 
particular case, there was one incumbent enacting the role of funeral 
director, both pre- and post-disaster. The three incumbents enacting the 
clerical role had pre-disaster roles of an embalmer, a marine recruiter, 
and a student. Mooney illustrates this relationship with a diagram:
Post-disaster Pre-disaster
Relationship Relationship Continuity (Y/N)
(1-2) Funeral Dir./ Funeral Dir./Embalmer Yes
Clerical
(1-2) Funeral Dir./ Funeral Dir./Marine No
Clerical
(1-2) Funeral Dir./ Funeral Dir./Student No
Clerical
__________________________________________________________________ (1) Funeral
Dir. (2) Clerical 1/3 or 33% cont.
(Mooney, 1989:44)
The relationship between the funeral director and the clerical roles is 
illustrated to be only 33% continuous, because the role of funeral 
director was linked only to the pre-disaster role of embalmer. This
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exercise shows that the relationship between this role pair is 
discontinuous. When examining the incumbent pairs, the pre- disaster 
role of coroner is seen to be continuous only with the role of the 
embalmer. The funeral director's role before the disaster was in no way 
related to the roles of the marine and the student. Therefore, two out 
of the three incumbent pairs prove to be discontinuous.
This description of Mooney's use of the second criterion will 
hopefully enable the reader to understand the major changes that have 
been made regarding this criterion for the present study, and also the 
progress of the methodology. When examining incumbents in terms of 
Mooney's conception of this criterion it became apparent that revision 
was needed. In order to have an accurate understanding of the 
relationships that individual organization members were involved in, it 
is necessary to examine separately their relationships that are internal 
and external to the organization. This approach will help support the 
examination of those incumbents who are involved in boundary- spanning 
roles.
A second major change in the conception of this criterion has been 
the distinction between organizational links and role links. In their 
interviews, many of the incumbents refer to specific individuals that 
they were linked to, and also to other groups and organizations. This 
distinction will allow these different types of links to be measured 
separately and analyzed as they could not be before. Again, this change 
will make our judgments concerning individual role enactment more 
accurate. These first two changes increase substantially the possible 
number of links that are examined in the present study. Mooney's
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examination of criterion two only compared links within the organization. 
I have extended this criterion in hopes of a more accurate portrayal of 
incumbent role relationships.
The criterion has also been extended in order to measure not only 
the continuity of the post-disaster links with the incumbent's 
pre-disaster occupational role, but also with any other relevant 
pre-disaster role. As mentioned in reference to criterion one, often the 
pre-disaster occupational role is not the role that is most relevant to 
the incumbent's disaster response involvement. For cases such as these, 
the incumbent's occupation is first examined in relation to his 
post-disaster links. Then, the incumbent's relevant role is noted, 
whether it be a secondary occupation or a relevant nonoccupation, and the 
same post-disaster links are examined in relation to it.
In Mooney's research the only role that was examined in this 
criterion was the primary occupational role. This distinction was made 
in order for the judgments to remain consistent. When examining 
incumbent performance I felt that it was necessary to consistently 
compare occupational roles with post-disaster links, and also to compare 
any other relevant roles. In cases in which the incumbent's occupational 
role is the relevant role to his disaster involvement, this is noted and 
the second part of the criterion is coded identically to the first.
The first part of criterion two concerns post-disaster links with 
the incumbent's pre-disaster role; all roles are defined in terms of 
occupation. The second half of the criterion concerns links with 
relevant pre-disaster roles. Each role link is described in terms of any 
possible relevant pre-disaster link to the incumbent, and likewise any
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relevant pre-disaster role of the incumbent is compared to these role 
links. The incumbent's relevant role therefore may not remain completely 
consistent for the second half of the criterion, but what is being 
measured is the continuity of role relationships. All possible means of 
comparison must be utilized in order to achieve an accurate description 
of the role relationships.
By revising this criterion for the present study to include 
distinctions between internal and external links and between role links 
and organizational links, I hope to better portray role relationships. 
These relationships, or links, are examined both in terms of occupational 
roles and in terms of any relevant pre- disaster role, relevant either 
to the link itself or to the incumbent. I believe that these changes 
show a general improvement of the methodology, particularly as it is 
applied to specific role incumbents rather than whole organizations.
Criterion Three
Finally, with the third criterion, "unique role performance versus 
role boundary expansion", Mooney attempted to determine whether or not 
the incumbent was involved in unique role performance or role boundary 
expansion. The goal was to determine how much of any given role 
enactment is rote performance and how much is innovative behavior on the 
part of the actor. She was interested in whether or not the data can be 
used to discriminate between greater or lesser amounts of role- playing 
and role-making when examining role enactment.
Mooney, on the advise of Ralph Turner, further developed this third
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dichotomy in order to clarify several important distinctions. Turner
argues that it is easy to under-represent role-playing in role-making,
and role-making in role-playing; again the paradox of action and order
is apparent. It is for this reason that he suggests that the third
criterion be further specified (1986). Mooney (1989) breaks down 
role-making as follows:
Role prototype enactment (role exists; change in incumbent; 
consistent performance)
Conventional enactment of a role by a new incumbent. The role 
is not part of the individual's normal repertoire. However,
the role is one characterized by widespread knowledge of and
about its enactment. The actor performs the role using 
whatever familiarity (s)he has with it.
Role re-definition (role exists; change in incumbent; 
inconsistent performance)
An improvised performance by a new incumbent (i.e. not 
consistent with pre-disaster experience). The participant 
has no (or very few) preformed notions with regard to enacting 
the role, and thus must decide what it is to entail. In 
another situation, the actor may have some limited familiarity 
with the role but must change the way it is performed to meet 
the needs of the situation. In any case, the participant uses 
whatever knowledge, if any, he may have in performing the 
role. The critical distinction being made here is simply to 
decide if the role is being improvised.
Radical role re-definition (role exists; change in incumbent; 
fundamental change in performance)
This meaning is distinct from role re-definition only in the 
degree to which the role is improvised. R a d i c a l  
re-definition implies a major diversion from the normal 
performance of a given role while the former implies less 
drastic modifications in performance.
Role invention (role does not exist; new incumbent; new 
performance)
An unprecedented situation arises for which there is n o 
previously defined set of procedures. A role must be created 
in this situation. Such circumstances are deemed unlikely to 
arise but are provided for operationally nonetheless.
Mooney breaks role-playing down into three distinct forms as follows:
Formal role enactment (role exists; no change in incumbent; 
consistent performance)
Participant enacts an existing role during an emergency
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situation which is consistent with his/her pre-disaster role 
repertoire. Actual enactment is consistent with officially 
imposed prescriptions for that role.
Working role enactment (role exists; no change in incumbent; 
improvised performance)
Participant enacts an existing role during an emergency
situation which is consistent with his/her pre-disaster role 
repertoire. However, improvisations which have been
informally negotiated among role incumbents are enacted to 
fill in gaps in formal prescriptions or increase effectiveness 
in a given situation (Turner, 1986, ch.9).
Radical transformation (role exists; no change in incumbent; 
fundamental change in performance)
Participant enacts an existing role during an emergency
situation which is consistent with his/her role repertoire. 
This situation involves improvisation also but is distinct 
from working role enactment in the degree and nature of the 
change in role performance. This means that the actor, in 
order to meet the unusual needs of the situation, must
drastically alter his/her role performance (e.g. a fireman who 
must allow a fire to burn without intervention for some
purpose)(Turner, 1986, ch.9).
Mooney's goal concerning this criterion was to determine the category of
each role enactment during a disaster. Again, as with criterion two,
this criterion has been changed a great deal in order to gain a better
understanding of incumbent role enactment.
For Mooney's thesis, each informant's role enactment was described 
by one of the seven forms of role-making and role- playing in order to 
get an overall score for each organization as a whole. As I began the 
analysis for the present study I struggled with the meaning of the forms 
of role enactment; the judgment made for each incumbent would now be the 
only basis for a score for this criterion. It seemed most essential to 
portray accurately each individual's role performance with the use of the 
seven forms. The more I pondered them, the more frustrated I became, and 
the more I felt that they needed to be modified.
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The question that I always came back to was "for whom does 'role' 
exist?" Mooney's definitions seem to focus on social definitions of 
role, but in a study of incumbents I kept asking myself if this were an 
accurate angle from which to examine individual role performance. I 
found contrasting cases in which the role performance would be judged 
identically in terms of the definitions, but the incumbents' degrees of 
innovativeness seemed radically different. It seemed that if the focus 
of the present study were to be on incumbent role enactment, a series of 
distinctions between role-making and role-playing should be used that 
would account for the experiences and knowledge of the individual; in 
short, the individual's whole role repertoire and his perception of his 
enactment should be somehow considered.
The solution was the extension of the methodology to include a 
characterization of the incumbent's role enactment in terms of how social 
or general knowledge would interpret his performance in the new role, and 
a characterization of the incumbent's role enactment in terms of his own 
perception of the performance, based on his role repertoire. This 
differentiation had an interesting result; I realized that the 
distinction is relevant when considering role-making, but not when 
considering role- playing. When role-playing, it is reasonable to assume 
that an actor encompasses both his own specific knowledge and experience 
in his performance of the role, and any general social knowledge of what 
that role entails. The new distinction cannot apply to role-playing.
An obvious question that the researcher asks himself is "how can one 
incumbent be involved in two types of role enactment?" Of course each 
individual enacts a role only in one way. When concerned with
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role-making however, it is essential to understand that the judgment 
being made in this criterion concerns his enactment in two different 
ways. Because our social and individual knowledge and perception of 
roles (or anything else) is not always equal, how the social group views 
the role enactment and how the individual conceives of his or her 
enactment (and finally, how the researcher conceives of the enactment) 
can possibly be very different.
The question now becomes one of defining the distinctions within 
role-making. Considering the different types of role- making, one
questions the different degrees of innovation as experienced by 
individuals relative to any social knowledge about a new role. The 
interviews of the disaster response participants suggest that the degree 
of specialized knowledge that a role requires will influence the degree 
of innovativeness experienced by the actor, depending upon his
familiarity with that knowledge. In response to a disaster, a person's
new role may be to compile a list of all volunteers. This role does not 
require specialized knowledge; most people have an idea of what compiling 
a list entails and how one would go about doing that, even if they had 
never done anything like that before. However, a person's new role might 
be that of public health administrator. This scenario did occur and is 
described fully as a part of the detailed case studies. This role most 
definitely requires specialized knowledge and training, and if the 
incumbent did not have this necessary knowledge he would be faced with 
a great deal of innovation. Again, the distinction between role-playing 
and role-making must be made clear. The degree of the incumbent's 
knowledge of his post-disaster role is not important for role- playing
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because he has been established in that role and it is assumed that he
has the necessary knowledge, but it is a critical factor for role-making.
The discussion above suggests that social knowledge and the level 
of our individual knowledge of a role influence the degree of innovation 
that is exhibited when role-making. A second variable that seems to
influence the degree of innovation is the degree of destruction caused 
by the disaster. In cases in which there is mass destruction and there 
are few operating resources that remain available to the survivors, the 
degree of role innovation would logically increase, whether considering 
role- making or role-playing. Any judgments made concerning innovation 
due to the degree of destruction will be made by the researcher,
considering the information given by the respondent about his role 
performance. Although innovation is not in itself the focus of this 
study, it is a major factor in determining the form of role enactment, 
and it therefore seems relevant to recognize these two influencing
variables and how they affect innovation.
The one variable that influences judgments made about role- playing 
would be the degree of the disaster's impact, or more generally, the 
change in the context within which the role is played. Because the 
incumbent maintains the same role, and because individual knowledge or 
general knowledge of a role is not a variable in determining innovation, 
the degree of the disaster impact is the only variable that would cause 
the incumbent to innovate in a routine role when considering role- 
playing.
It is important also to note that the degree of the disaster impact 
is one of several measures of the change in the context of the situation
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for the role performers. The change in the context of a given role is 
one of the variables that calls for innovation, and there are countless 
other variables related to such changed contexts. A case exists in the 
sample in which the city manager of a major city in Alaska is called to 
act as the city manager for a small village following a devastating 
earthquake. In this case, not only is the emergency itself cause for 
innovation, but the fact that the incumbent was called to perform his 
role in a completely new location adds to the changed context for his 
role. In the present study it is the disaster event that usually prompts 
innovation, and the degree of its impact usually is the basis from which 
such judgments concerning context are made. It must be recognized that 
this is only one concrete measure of the change of context that might 
occur during any form of role-making.
Because role-playing encompasses both general and individual 
knowledge of how to perform a given role, only Mooney's definitions of 
role-making need to be modified in order to distinguish between these 
approaches to role enactment. When considering distinctions within 
role-making, it seems that the level of disaster impact, general 
knowledge of role requirements, and incumbent knowledge of those same 
requirements all must be considered. An eight-fold property space that 
illustrates the probabilities of the emergence of the different forms of 
role-making can be developed (Table 3). This table shows the likelihood 
of the different forms of role-making to occur under specified conditions 
involving the three variables. It also helps to define the 
new distinctions between general and individual knowledge definitions of
TABLE 3: Forms of Role-Making In Terms of
Generalized Knowledge
Incumbent
Knowledges
Incumbent
Knowledges
Low Impact Disaster Events
Knowledge required to perform role:
GENERAL SPECIALIZED
HIGH Role Prototype Role Prototype
Enactment Enactment
LOW Role Role
Re-definition Re-definition
High Impact Disaster Events
Knowledge required to perform role:
GENERAL SPECIALIZED
HIGH Role Role
Re-definition Re-definition
LOW Radical Role Radical Role
Re-definition Re-definition
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these forms of role-making.
It is important to note here that the table does not account for 
middle-level degrees of specialized knowledge. Obviously any person's 
given knowledge of a specialized role will vary from none to complete. 
The current data do provide examples of differences between full and 
partial specialized knowledge, and these distinctions will be accounted 
for. The table only accounts for situations in which the incumbent has 
no knowledge or complete knowledge. During the data, collection process 
any differences as to the degree of an incumbent's specialized knowledge 
of a role have been judged by the researcher. The researcher determines 
whether the role requires some partial degree of specialized knowledge 
or total knowledge, and whether or not the incumbent's repertoire 
includes the necessary specialized knowledge.
The table itself will help define the revised conception of 
role-making. It specifies the degree of knowledge required to perform 
the role, and it specifies the degree of the disaster event's impact. 
The researcher, with an understanding of the incumbent's role performance 
and role repertoire, can then make an assessment as to the degree of 
innovation that the incumbent enacted, and can determine what specific 
type of role-making the incumbent participated in. The table suggests 
that role prototype enactment is most likely to occur during low impact 
disaster responses when the incumbent has whatever knowledge is required 
to perform the role, either general or specific. During these same 
events, if the incumbent does not have the necessary knowledge to perform 
the role, he will most likely have to improvise to a higher degree, and 
he will therefore be involved in role re-definition.
36
Each variable affects the degree of the incumbent's necessary 
innovation. When they are compounded, the need for the incumbent to 
innovate increases. These categories are not exclusive; they simply 
show the probabilities for the different forms of role enactment. It is 
possible for radical role re- definition or even role invention to occur 
during low impact disaster events, as I will discuss in the "Findings", 
but these cases would be unusual. They would not be impossible as long 
as the researcher feels that a judgment can be made that suggests that 
the new role requires so much specialized knowledge, knowledge of which 
the incumbent has none.
It is most likely thdt high impact disaster events themselves will 
require a great deal of innovation on the part of incumbents playing new 
roles in disaster responses. Even incumbents who possess all required 
knowledge of the new role will be faced with such an unusual situation 
that they will have to highly improvise their performance. When 
incumbents do not have the necessary knowledge as a part of their role 
repertoires, they will most likely be involved in radical role 
re-definition. Naturally the type of the high impact will also affect 
this innovation; the path of a huge tornado may not render a whole city 
as helpless as a devastating earthquake, and this may also be reflected 
in the improvisation of role incumbents.
The use of this property space will enable future researchers to 
more clearly define innovation, and therefore more categorically 
determine what form of role enactment is taking place. It is a good tool 
for examining role performance in terms of general social knowledge 
because it allows the researcher to be consistent in his judgments. The
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second judgment that has been added to this criterion involves accounting 
for the respondent's perception concerning his role enactment, and this 
cannot be captured by a table.
Finally, role invention must be considered. Mooney writes that 
"such circumstances are deemed unlikely to arise but are provided for 
operationally nonetheless". It seems that there is no conceivable 
circumstance under which role invention in these terms might take place. 
As long as humans live in social groups they will have some basis for any 
role that they perform. Even in the case of total thermo-nuclear 
destruction it would seem that many of the same social roles would be 
played, although new, unprecedented situations might arise that would 
require the creation of new roles.
Role invention is seen as an outlier both in terms of general and 
individual knowledge of role performance, as well as in terms of the 
degree of the disaster impact. However, I argue that from an individual 
standpoint, role invention is not impossible. One case from the 
methodology, which I will discuss fully as a case analysis, led me to 
think that it is possible for an individual to be faced with playing a 
highly specialized role about which he knows absolutely nothing. It 
would be a rare situation for an individual to be forced into a role that 
required highly specialized knowledge and experience, a role that he had 
no knowledge of, but it is not inconceivable.
Mooney conceptualized a continuum of innovation that encompassed 
both role-playing and role-making, with formal role enactment and role 
prototype enactment being at one end, and radical transformation and 
radical role re-definition being at the other (Table 4). Role invention
TABLE 4: Role-Playing Role-Making Index
ROLE-PLAYING - - - 
Formal Working
Role Role Radical
Enactment Enactment Transformation
I
 1----------------------
Increasing Innovation - .......... - - -
Role Role Radical
Prototype Re-definition Role
Enactment Re-definition
> Role 
Invention
ROLE-MAKING -
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was considered an outlier and unique to role-making. The further 
distinctions made in the present study between forms of role-making can 
also be conceptualized in terms of this type of continuum. The index 
illustrates a continuum of innovation, and how role-playing and 
role-making are a part of that continuum and both involve improvisation 
o r innova t i on.
This index can then be used to create a scale of innovation. Every 
instance of formal role enactment or role prototype enactment will be 
given a score of one, signifying the lowest degree of innovation. 
Working role enactment and role re- definition are combined in the second 
level and receive a score of two, and the third level is made up of 
radical transformation and radical role re-definition, which receive 
scores of three. Role invention is scored four, the highest level of 
innovation. The higher the number, the greater the degree of innovation 
that exists for the incumbent, or if combined, for the organization.
The further distinctions in the present methodology call for two 
judgments to be made concerning role-making. The different judgments 
will change the scores on the innovation scale, and will illustrate the 
differences in perceived innovation between a general perception and an 
individual perception of the role enactment.
At this point I have sufficiently presented the methodology, 
measurements, and definitions of the significant concepts relative to the 
present research. It must be emphasized that the greater proportion of 
the methodology for this research is qualitative. I have relayed much 
of the quantitative measures that will be vital, but the core of this 
project has involved examining interviews and making judgments concerning
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the types of role enactments that incumbents perform. The differences 
between the present methodology and Mooney's methodology will hopefully 
lead to better future measures and conceptions of role.
The logical method for explaining these changes is by use of example 
from the sample, particularly since any ideas for changing the criteria 
came from experiences in applying the methodology to particular cases. 
The following section will give examples of several cases in which 
unusual judgments were made concerning these criteria. These examples 
will hopefully clear any confusion, and further clarify the present 
method of study.
FINDINGS
What remains is a discussion of the findings from the present 
research. I will begin, as mentioned above, by illustrating the
methodology by use of examples from the data. Five case studies of
individual participation in emergent organizations will be discussed. 
The first case was chosen because the data were especially thorough; the 
respondent participated in one lengthy personal interview and one group 
interview. This case will show the reader a detailed application of the 
present methodology, and will highlight some of the methodological 
differences between the present study and Mooney's.
The second and third case studies describe the participation of two
respondents in the same disaster response group. Although members of the 
same organization, the respondents' role enactments were radically 
different and illustrate the value of the present study's examination of 
individual incumbents as opposed to whole organizations. The third case 
study also illustrates the changes that have been made in the conception 
and measurement of the third criterion. The fourth case study also 
demonstrates the changes made in the third criterion, and considers 
important differences that are distinguished for the first criterion 
between the two methodologies.
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Finally, the fifth case illustrates methodological differences when 
considering the leadership section of the methodology, and also the first 
and second criteria. There are few cases for which the changes of the 
second criterion are very significant, and this case provides a very good 
example. This last case illustrates the important differences between 
methodologies when determining leadership roles.
Following the case studies, I will discuss how often and to what 
extent the methodological changes were significant to the final results 
of the data collection process. In this section, only those cases thdt 
were examined in both the present research and in Mooney's will be used 
to compare the different researcher judgments about role enactment.
To complete the findings section, I will summarize the results of 
my own data collection process. This section will describe the extent 
of role-making or role-playing that exists among these emergent disaster 
organization participants.
FINDINGS PART ONE: CASE STUDIES
Case Study One: Structural Engineer
In 1964 a major earthquake occurred in Alaska, the worst in the 
state's history. One major city was affected severely; in fact, the 
first reports to reach the continental United States claimed that there 
were no survivors. The director of the building construction and 
maintenance department became a primary leader in Anchorage for the 
response to this disaster. He was a leader in an organization that 
emerged following the earthquake, one that Kreps characterized as a 
T-R-A-D form in his original study. The following is an examination of 
the changes in his role performance in response to the earthquake.
In order to make judgments concerning his role performance during 
the disaster, it is necessary first to understand the city structural 
engineer's routine occupational role performance. His occupation was that 
of building construction and maintenance superintendent. He was in 
charge of the maintenance of 86 public buildings in Anchorage, and served 
as the city structural engineer and city architect. He usually had six 
men working as mechanics, two or three engineers, and one assistant. His 
team inspected buildings and made necessary repairs. He spent time 
reviewing architectural plans for new buildings, making corrections, and 
planning the department budget. His department was only one division of 
the Department of Public Works. With this basic knowledge of his
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occupational role, an examination of his role enactment following the 
earthquake can begin.
The earthquake hit at approximately 5:30 p.m. on a Friday afternoon, 
a time when many people were en route home. The director of the building 
construction and maintenance department was one of these people. When 
the quake subsided, he again headed for his home, and passed a friend 
with whom he had planned to have dinner. He learned from the friend that 
his home and his wife were safe, and immediately turned around and headed 
back towards town. He felt that as a member of the public works 
department, his services would be needed in response to the disaster.
He arrived at the Public Safety Building at approximately 5:45 p.m. 
and found what he called "mass confusion". There were many people 
volunteering their help, but there was no organization. He went to a 
desk and began assembling people into groups that might prove useful for 
search and rescue and damage control and assessment. These groups were 
made up of volunteers, police and fire department personnel, city public 
works personnel, as well as National Guardsmen. Through the 
organization led by the structural engineer, these teams began their 
activities within an hour of the earthquake's impact. The engineer also 
reports that a central desk was being manned by members of the police 
department. Many people were asking questions of these policemen that 
they could not answer. He states that "I went up to the desk myself and 
I started answering these questions and started giving uh, specific 
directions and making uh, specific decisions. And I think right then and 
there was when this little group was born" (p.5).
This emergent organization worked through the night, and became
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more organized and efficient the second day. It became recognized as 
"disaster control" or "damage control" by Saturday afternoon, and was 
commonly known as the group most involved in response to the earthquake. 
This is evidenced by the fact that as the National Guard and the Army 
rescue teams became involved they chose to receive their instructions 
from the structural engineer and his organization.
For the next five days the structural engineer led a notably 
effective response to the earthquake. In addition to forming search and 
rescue teams and damage assessment teams, the organization and its leader 
became involved in creating a filing system to catalogue all of their 
volunteers, made armbands for volunteers, "commandeered" the city fuel 
station, installed temporary city generators in public buildings, made 
temporary toilets, opened shelters, provided security guards, and 
performed many other varied tasks. All of the actions of the group were 
led by the engineer in the name of the city of Anchorage, but it is 
essential to note that he did not have any official authority. He states 
that he began acting as the local authority because the city government 
was slow to react and make decisions in the earthquake's aftermath. In 
fact, he said "my own opinion is that uh, a great many of our normal 
leaders were actually followers" (p.28).
Why did this emergent group, led by the city structural engineer,
seem to replace the existing city government? When he first arrived at
the Public Safety Building, the engineer reports that the Chief of
Police, a Police Captain, and the City Attorney were there. It was the 
City Attorney and the Police Captain who helped him in the moments 
immediately following the earthquake. The Chief of Police seemed to be
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in shock, and it was the Captain of the Police Department that took over
and sent men out to control traffic and crowds. The city engineer also
states that the local Civil Defense was virtually inactive that first
evening. Of the Director of the local Civil Defense he said:
The question that I have heard most out of the Colonel constantly 
since the first moments after he showed up and the first, up until 
now, up till this very day, is 'Well, who's going to assume this 
responsibility? Who is going to give me this authority?' I think, 
my own personal opinion is that it is his responsibility and it is 
his authority, in that position anyway. It happens that we have a 
man in that post who either chooses not to or is unable to rise to 
his responsibility, but we do have the post and the post should be 
granted authority (p.27).
It seems that immediately following the earthquake the formal authority
in Anchorage was crippled, while the city engineer's organization was an
immediate, rational response.
A sign of the central authority that this new group leader had was 
his role in coordinating the activities of other various groups. The 
engineer describes his relations with Army rescue teams, the Alaska 
Mountaineering Group and the Alaska Rescue Group, the local Civil 
Defense, the Salvation Army, the Alaska General Contractors' Association, 
the Eskimo Scouts, and various members of the city government, such as 
the City Manager, the City Attorney, and the City Police Department. In 
offering their assistance, these groups came to the leader of "disaster 
control" because the organization he led was the most effective during 
the first days of the emergency.
As the response progressed, the city government began taking more 
control. It is interesting that the new leader, who had never previously 
attended city council meetings, was asked to be present at every
emergency meeting following the earthquake. He played a prominent role
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in these meetings, even though he had no place on the council and had no 
real connection with it. By Tuesday the council decided that the 
response should be coordinated by the various city agencies and 
departments that were intended to handle such problems. They decided 
that the engineer's group would begin "fading out" that day. He reports 
that by Wednesday afternoon he had stopped coordinating the response, and 
had sent all requests for assistance to the various city departments. 
It was difficult to channel the different requests away from his 
organization at first because people had become used to its operation, 
and because people felt that it was the only organization that could 
effectively handle their problems.
Having an overall picture of the role of the city engineer in the 
"disaster control" group, it is now possible to examine his involvement 
in terms of the methodology. I will proceed by taking the reader through 
the codebook step by step as it has been prepared for this respondent. 
The first section involves biographical information about the engineer, 
most of which has already been discussed during the process of examining 
his role enactment.
The second section of the methodology concerns the leadership
information. First, I note that the leader of "disaster control" was an
instrumental leader. His role as group coordinator was essential to the
enactment of the disaster response. I did not categorize him as an
expressive leader. The building construction and maintenance foreman,
when referring to the group coordinator in his interview, said that:
He's told me uh any decision I make if uh you know that he' 11 stand 
behind it. and he trusts mv judgment, so I mean I go ahead. . . .1 mean 
I do uh you know uh anything that amounts to something, I always uh, 
you know I like to have his opinion because he is the boss, but I
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mean uh, he always you know respects my decisions (p.21) [emphasis 
added].
During the emergency the leader encouraged the teams to make their own 
decisions as they came upon them because they would not have contact with 
him or any other authority. It seems that he may have been an expressive 
leader as evidenced by his manner of instructing and encouraging the 
teams. However, because this information did not come directly from the 
incumbent's interview, I have not used it to make a judgment concerning 
his expressive leadership role. I recognize that this may not portray 
accurately this incumbent's leadership, but because this present is an 
incumbent study, it is essential to develop a specific method for 
identifying and judging role performance, and that method entails noting 
only the perspective given by the incumbent in his interview.
A judgment is now made concerning conflict in the structural 
engineer's leadership. It seems that in this case leadership was not 
negotiated, but there was conflict. When he arrived at the Public Safety 
Building the legitimate authorities were not taking control over the 
situation. He saw the problems and simply began making the decisions 
that he felt were necessary and that needed to be made. There were many 
with whom he had friction following his assumption of leadership, 
primarily members of the city government. There were many who felt that 
he had no right to assume the authority that he did. Because he was the 
primary leader of "disaster control", I also note that there was conflict 
in the overall leadership of the organization.
The examination of the three criteria completes the methodology. 
When considering the first criterion, "inconsistency versus consistency
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of pre- and post-disaster status/role", a simple judgment comparing the 
engineer's occupation and his post-disaster role is made. I argue that 
his pre-disaster role of "Building Construction Superintendent" was 
inconsistent with his post-disaster role of "Coordinator of Disaster 
Control". He did not perform tasks that were within the scope of his 
occupational role. He also made many more decisions and took on greater 
authority than he did during his routine role performance. He had no 
secondary occupational roles or primary non-occupational roles related 
to his involvement in the disaster response; this one judgment is 
sufficient when considering criterion one.
Criterion two, "discontinuity versus continuity of pre- and 
post-impact role relationships", examines the relationships that the 
incumbents had before and after the disaster to determine whether or not 
there were any new relationships that evolved out of the disaster 
response process. Links that are both internal and external to the 
organization are considered, and links to specific individuals and links 
to organizations are separately noted. Pre-impact links can be 
determined from the incumbent's occupational role, while post-impact 
links are often described by the respondent during the interview. Table 
five has been prepared to illustrate these links for the case of the city 
structural engineer.
There are four specific internal links with individuals described 
by the leader of the "disaster control" group. All were members directly 
involved in the leadership of the organization. The first member joined 
the group on Saturday morning and coordinated the secretarial staff. His 
pre-disaster occupation was that of a business agent for unions, and he
TABLE 5: Criterion 2 as coded for Director of 
Building Construction and Maintenance Department.
INTERNAL
Post-disaster Link
Link to roles:
1. Secretarial Staff 
Coordinator
2. Resource 
Coordinator
3. Search Team 
Leader
4. Search and Rescue 
Coordinator
Link to Organizations:
5. Search and Rescue 
Participation
6. Search and Rescue 
Participation
7. Search and Rescue 
Participation
EXTERNAL
Post-disaster Link
Link to roles:
8. Chief of Police
9. City Manager
10. City Attorney
Pre-disaster Link (continuity)
Union Business Agent
Bill Collecting Agent
Building Construction 6?
Maintenance Foreman 
University Professor
Alaska Mountaineer 
Group 
Alaska Rescue Group
Eskimo Scouts
N
N
Y
N
Pre-disaster Link (continuity*)
Chief of Police 
City Manager 
City Attorney
N
Y
Y
Link to Organizations:
11. Police Department Police Department Y
12. Army Rescue Teams Army N
13. Civil Defense Civil Defense N
14. Salvation Army Salvation Army N
15. City Council City Council N
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mentions that he also had construction experience. His occupational role 
was not linked to the occupational role of the structural engineer before 
the disaster. A second member ran a bill collecting agency and became 
involved in the organization on Saturday also. He set up the filing 
system for volunteers. His occupation and that of a structural engineer 
were not linked pre-disaster, so this relationship is also categorized as 
discontinuous. A third member was a building construction and maintenance 
foreman who worked as a part of the structural engineer's department 
before the earthquake. His participation involved the leadership of one 
of the damage assessment groups. Because they worked together in the 
Building Construction and Maintenance Department before the disaster, 
this relationship is continuous. Finally, the fourth member joined'the 
group on Saturday and coordinated all of the search and rescue teams. He 
was a psychology professor, so his relationship with the structural 
engineer was discontinuous.
There are three internal links that the leader of "disaster control" 
had with organizations. All three of these groups participated in search 
and rescue operations through the emergent organization. The activities 
of the Alaska Mountaineer Group, the Alaska Rescue Group, and the Eskimo 
Scouts were coordinated by the structural engineer following the 
disaster. They did not operate independently, but worked as a part of 
"disaster control". All three of these relationships are judged 
discontinuous because there is no logical connection between a structural 
engineer and any of these three organizations.
In terms of his external links, the engineer had eight: three with
individuals and five with organizations. His three external links with
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individuals were with the Chief of Police, the City Manager, and the City 
Attorney, all of Anchorage. I made the first judgment that the director 
of building construction and maintenance would not normally have a 
relationship in terms of their occupations with the Chief of Police. I 
did, however, think that he might have relationships with the City 
Manager and the City Attorney through his occupation. As a city 
employee, and specifically as the director of a division of the 
Department of Public Works, it seems likely that he would have some 
contact with these two members of the city management.
It may seem inconsistent that I judged the engineer's relationship 
with the Chief of Police as discontinuous while judging his relationship 
with the general Police Department as continuous. His occupation led him 
to have contact with every city department through repairs and 
inspections of their buildings. While it seems unlikely that he would 
have individual contact with the Chief of Police through his role as the 
director of building construction and maintenance, it seems that he would 
have general contact with some members of the police department in his 
routine occupation. This judgment was confirmed by a call to the local 
municipal maintenance department, from which I learned that they are 
routinely in contact and therefore linked to the Police Department.
The four other external links with organizations were judged to be 
discontinuous. There is no reason that through his occupation the 
incumbent would have any contacts with the Army and its rescue teams, the 
local Civil Defense, or the Salvation Army. I also think that he made 
it clear in his interviews that he had no previous connection with the 
City Council. Although he was a city employee, that in itself does not
53
suggest that he would have any routine relationship with the City 
Council. This is supported by the fact that he specifically noted in his 
interview that he had been asked to attend the emergency Council 
meetings, and that he had never had any contact with this group before.
This concludes the examination of the second criterion. Because the 
engineer's occupational role was also his pre- disaster role that was 
most relevant to his disaster response participation, the second half of 
criterion 2 will be coded in the same manner as the first half.
All of the previous background information has been given in order 
to make a judgment concerning the engineer's specific role performance. 
The third criterion distinguishes whether the incumbent was involved in 
role-making or role-playing, and makes further distinctions by using the 
seven categories developed by Mooney. As explained in the research 
methodology section, this study distinguishes role-making further by 
examining each incumbent's post-disaster role performance first in terms 
of the role as it is generally or socially known, and then in terms of 
the incumbent's perception of his performance of that role in terms of 
his role repertoire. This distinction enables the present research to 
examine the post-disaster role structurally in terms of social knowledge, 
and structurally in terms of the individual's perception.
The engineer's involvement in the disaster control organization can 
be categorized as role-making, and when considering it specifically in 
terms of generalized knowledge as role re-definition. He became the 
coordinator of the emergent organization, a role that was new to him. 
In this new role he performed the tasks of an administrator during a very 
unstable time period. From the interview one gets the impression that
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the decisions he made were plain and rational. He stated that he saw 
what needed to be done and did it, while the legitimate government 
hesitated to make decisions for fear that they might not have specific 
authority. It seems that this role did not require any specialized 
knowledge; just common sense and the courage to act rationally without 
any specific authority. He essentially acted in place of the city 
government. The role that he enacted was one that I believe he had 
general knowledge of, and one that there is generalized knowledge of. 
His was a case of role re-definition rather than role .prototype enactment 
because he assumed a great amount of authority; authority even the city 
government, had it been active, may not have possessed legitimately. In 
this case, one of the context variables that requires the respondent to 
innovate is the inactivity of the local government.
I do not classify the engineer's role enactment any differently when 
considering his individual perception of his participation in the 
disaster response organization based on his role repertoire. His 
experience in building construction and maintenance were important to 
many of the tasks of the organization, and thus to his leadership role, 
but the decisions that he made and the amount of authority that he took 
upon himself were not at all like his primary role before the disaster. 
The role he assumed was new to him, and the stresses of the emergency 
situation would only serve to magnify any difficulties he might have with 
the new role. In his interview he reports that the role was very 
different from his normal, routine role as a structural engineer. I 
think that he was involved in role re-definition when examining his own 
experiences.
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This case has illustrated the workings of the methodology as it is 
applied to an especially complete body of information. The director of 
the building construction and maintenance department was involved in one 
individual interview and one group interview, and his role as coordinator 
made him an important topic for other members of the organization to 
discuss during their own interviews. I will follow this example with the 
examination of cases which may not be as detailed or complete, but which 
either have unique and interesting circumstances, or which present 
unique problems for the methodology that had to be resolved.
Case Studies Two and Three:
Health Department Employee, Biochemical Researcher
The following examples from the methodology will illustrate two 
cases in which the respondents participated in the same organization but 
had very different types of role enactments. These cases are not only 
interesting because of their differences; they will serve as an example 
of why the third criterion was changed in the present study from the 
format used by Mooney, and as an explanation of why the examination of 
role incumbents was a logical and necessary step following the work of 
Mooney. The two men became involved in the Emergency City Health 
Services of a major city, an organization that began offering medical 
treatments and performing waste disposal activities two days after the 
earthquake of 1964. Kreps characterized this emergent organization as 
a D-R-T-A form in his original study.
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RESPONDENT ONE: Health Department Employee
I will begin with an examination of the role performance of an 
employee of the City Health Department. He was involved in an 
organization which also responded to the earthquake of 1964. The Sunday 
following the earthquake he became active as a member of the city 
emergency health services.
In a description of the City Health Department, he states that the 
main purpose of the local health department is to provide preventative 
medical services, particularly during emergency situations. This is
handled by the nursing division. The second division involves sanitation 
and is concerned primarily with determining the safety of water supplies 
and effective methods for waste disposal. This information is the most 
that is given concerning his occupation, and he tells very little about 
his personal background. It is clear that the motivation for his
response involvement was due to his occupational role.
The health worker reports that following the earthquake, the health
department functioned as it always had. The only difference he noted
between normal work days and the emergency period was the weekly meetings
with the local Civil Defense, which is routine for an emergency period.
His first remark during the interview was:
As far as I could tell ah of trying to compare the ah ah operation 
of the Health Department with ah the operation of the department
before the earthquake ah I don't think that ah I could say that
there have been too many large changes that ah have been made (p.l) .
It does not seem that he was a leader in the organization either before 
or after the disaster; he performed his regular duties as an employee of 
the Health Department following the earthquake.
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Considering criterion one, I have judged the health department 
employee's post-disaster role and his occupation to be consistent. He 
makes this consistency perfectly clear, and therefore this judgment was 
fairly obvious. Mooney made the same judgment. He does not mention any 
links with other individuals or organizations that he had during the 
disaster period. For this reason criterion two will seem meaningless, 
but it seems clear from the information given that any links he may have 
had would have been normal and routine.
I consider the health employee's involvement in the disaster 
response to be formal role enactment, the basic and routine role-playing 
of his occupational role. Because he was involved in role-playing, there 
is no need to distinguish between the general knowledge of what the role 
required and his own knowledge of what it required. General knowledge 
of the requirements of the role of "health department employee" would be 
subsumed by the respondent's own experience and knowledge from his 
occupation, so any distinction is moot. There may have been some 
differences simply because of the fact that his involvement was during 
an emergency period, but he makes no mention of extra pressure or an 
unusual amount of work. In addition, he noted that his department's 
mission is to provide emergency medical services when needed; therefore, 
the emergency setting was somewhat anticipated. For these reasons, his 
case is an example of formal role enactment. Again, Mooney's and my 
judgments were the same.
RESPONDENT TWO: Biochemical Researcher
The case of the second respondent is drastically different. He was
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a biochemist who was the Director of the Laboratory of the Arctic Health 
Research Center. He had no previous ties with the City Health 
Department. On the Sunday following the disaster, he learned that he was 
the head of the City Emergency Health Services, the Health Department's 
response to the earthquake. He was told that the former director of the 
Arctic Health Research Center had worked with the Civil Defense as the 
Emergency Health Services chairman. The former director had been 
replaced, but the local Civil Defense assumed that the new director would 
assume the same responsibility. He learned of his position and had no 
idea what his responsibilities were.
On Sunday he reported to the Public Health Building. He was told 
that he was in charge of all emergency medical services. A spokesman 
from the south central region of the Civil Defense told him that he 
should be concerned with a possible typhoid outbreak. Although he 
mentions that he thought it was unnecessary, he instructed the public 
health nurses to begin offering typhoid vaccinations. He says that he 
did this because he was told to, and tells that he did not have much 
contact with anyone at the Civil Defense or with the regional spokesman 
after his first meeting.
As the Emergency Health Services Chairman he was called to begin 
inspecting restaurants, but he had no experience in sanitation either. 
He had one sanitarian on the staff, so he had him take over this 
responsibility. He told the interviewer that he felt that all he could 
really do was stand behind the staff of the department, and that his main 
job was to tell people to do what they already knew had to be done. Near 
the close of the interview he reported that “he was asked questions where
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he did not even know what the word meant which was used in the question" 
(p.5). He also said that he had no previous experience with disasters 
at all, and that they were good things to stay away from.
As with the previous case, very little is given about the 
respondent's personal background. It is obvious that his motivation for 
involvement came from his occupational role; because of his occupation 
he "fell into" the role. Also, he did act as a leader, even though at 
first he did not know or understand his duties.
When considering this case only in terms of the information given 
by the single incumbent's interview, this case illustrates an interesting 
contrast to the case of the health department employee; I argue that it 
is an example of role-making. It is interesting to note, however, that 
even though the biochemist's occupational role and his post-disaster role 
were in no way similar, they were consistent. There was no question for 
the Civil Defense as to who would be the Emergency Health Services 
Chairman, only to the incumbent. By the same reasoning, the respondent's 
nonoccupational role, that of Emergency Health Services Chairman, was 
also consistent, even though he had no knowledge of that role (criterion 
one). The two links that he mentioned were external role links, one with 
the local director of the Civil Defense and the other with the regional 
spokesman of the Civil Defense; both were discontinuous with his 
occupational role as a biochemist and director of a research laboratory 
(criterion two). Mooney would agree with both of these judgments. He 
did not specifically mention any link with the health department 
employee, and for this reason he was not considered.
Criterion three is unique for this case, and an outlier in terms of
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the data. This case presents problems that caused the criterion to be 
extended in the present study. I consider this a case of role 
re-definition when considering society's general knowledge of the role 
of "public health administrator", but role invention when considering the 
respondent's own role repertoire and perception of his performance. 
Generally, the idea of the role of a public health officer may seem 
straight forward. As the codebook's definition reads for role 
re-definition, "the role exists, change in incumbent, improvised 
performance". When looking at role from a social standpoint, it can be 
argued that the biochemist simply filled the open role, and because he 
was not familiar with it he had to improvise his performance. For her 
study, Mooney characterized the biochemist performance as role 
re-definition.
I was not comfortable with this characterization of his role 
enactment. I felt that it did not capture the degree of innovativeness 
that the biochemist experienced as an individual in response to the 
disaster. It occurred to me that this criterion as it was might measure 
the degree of innovation and change that was experienced by the role 
itself rather than the respondent. Because of this, the degree of 
individual innovativeness might greatly vary while the code description 
would remain the same. Because the present research focuses on the
individual and individual role enactment, I felt that it would be 
necessary to consider both of these types of innovation.
I argue that when considering the biochemist's role repertoire, his 
is a rare example of role invention. The role he performed did not exist 
to his knowledge before he was called to fill it, and he had no
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experience in any relevant area to the tasks he performed. He 
specifically did not have the. necessary specialized knowledge, experience 
or education that the role required. He was not a doctor, and was forced 
into a role in which he needed a doctor's knowledge and experience. He 
mentioned several times that he felt there were many people who would 
have been better suited for his position because of his total ignorance 
of public health matters.
This case is an example of the most remote sort of exception to the 
rule. There were three other cases in the sample for which the coding 
for role-making changed. When considered in terms of a general 
perception of the role enactment, those cases were coded as demonstrating 
higher innovation than when the individual's perception was taken into 
account. This is the reverse of the case of the bio-chemist. The 
researcher has to make a judgment concerning the incumbent's role 
repertoire, and therefore on his degree of generalized knowledge. It 
appears that in the other three cases the incumbents must have had a 
better understanding of their new role than one would expect because they 
were involved in so little innovation, according to their own 
perceptions.
These two cases are interesting in that they show the possibility 
of drastically different forms of role enactment occurring in one 
organization. While Mooney examined whole organizations, these cases 
provide an explanation for the reason I chose to specifically examine 
role incumbents. Treated as informants, Mooney considered the whole 
organization of the Emergency Health Services and compared it to others.
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Kreps and his associates, myself as one, thought that this focus might 
underrepresent some of the action that could take place in these 
organizations at an individual level. These cases show that the focus 
of the present research does allow for such action to be separately and 
individually examined and considered.
Case Study Four: Director, Department of Natural Resources
The following case study will serve as an example of one of the 
differences between Mooney's and the present methodology. The problem 
that it creates is a unique one, and one that illustrates the utility of 
both an organizational and an individual approach to the study of role. 
The methodological differences between Mooney's and the present study 
call for this case to be coded very differently for the first and third 
criteria.
This case involves the participation of the Director of the State 
Department of Natural Resources in an organization that emerged in 
response to widespread flooding in a southwestern state in 1965. This 
group was involved in collecting information concerning water levels 
throughout the region, and with issuing warnings. Kreps characterized 
this organization as an R-T-A-D form in his original study (Saunders and 
Kreps, 1987).
The Director of Natural Resources reports that his routine job is 
to coordinate approximately twenty agencies in the state that are 
involved with natural resources. He states that once he learned of the 
impending flood, he contacted all of the state water administrators and 
told them to begin monitoring water levels. This information was sent
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to his headquarters, which he had set up at the highway patrol office. 
He was involved for 72 hours in information gathering and dissemination. 
He took inventory of damages and initiated evacuation (and at times 
re-evacuation) procedures, all without benefit of a disaster plan.
I judged the first criterion as consistent when considering the 
natural resources director. It seemed from the information that he gives 
that he continued to work with natural resource agencies, coordinating 
them during the emergency period. As he reports the situation, we have 
no reason to think that he was not the normal person to fill this role. 
When considering the third criterion, I made the judgment that his 
performance could be characterized as radical transformation, a form of 
role-playing. He was still directing agencies concerned with natural
resources, but he had to change his headquarters, and he was involved 
with damage assessment and evacuations, all without any disaster plan.
It seems to me that his was an instance of a great deal of innovation 
on the part of an incumbent performing his pre-disaster role as a member 
of an emergent response organization.
It is very interesting to compare my characterization of the 
resource director's role performance with Mooney's. Because hers was a 
study of whole organizations, she used all information that was available 
from any interview in order to make judgments concerning the role 
enactment of informants. From interviews with other organization members 
it is learned that unnecessary evacuations occurred because the natural 
resources director, unfamiliar with flood terminology and procedures, 
made unverified statements to the press and to law enforcement agencies. 
He was highly criticized by other members of the organization. They
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report that he had no authority, no knowledge, and no right to have held 
the position that he did during the emergency period.
Mooney, when assessing criterion one, argues that the resources 
director's role during the emergency was inconsistent with his
occupational role. From other informants she learned that he was in no
way responsible for the emergency flood response. He did not have the 
experience or technical knowledge to perform the role that he assumed, 
and therefore his role was considered inconsistent.
When considering criterion three, Mooney judged his performance as 
a form of role-making: role re-definition. She argues that he was
performing duties that were far beyond the scope of his routine
occupation. Not only was he performing new duties, he did not have the 
knowledge or skills to perform the role, and he made many mistakes. Due 
to his errors in disseminating warnings, some areas had to be evacuated 
at two different times and yet were never flooded.
This case illustrates the differences between the two types of role 
methodology. One incumbent is considered, and two very different 
assessments of his status/role nexus and his role performance are 
derived. Which one is correct? Each portrays his role enactment, but 
from different perspectives. The important factor in this case becomes 
the actual occupation of the Director of the Department of Natural 
Resources. According to other members of the disaster response group, 
the occupation that the resource director filled routinely had no 
connection with emergency responses in general, and with flooding in 
particular. They felt that he was in no position to be part of the 
group, much less to assume the position of leadership that he did.
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However, from the interview with the resource director himself, one is 
given the impression that he maintained his routine occupational duties 
during the flooding, and simply had to improvise his performance. He 
gives no indication that his occupational role should have had no real 
connection with the response to the floods.
’The important point to be made is that methods for studying role 
must be very precise and consistent in their examinations of individuals' 
performances. Although relatively rare, cases do exist for which two 
interpretations of the same role enactment seem valid. Researchers must 
be clear as to their angle, whether it is from an organizational 
standpoint or from an individual one, because the present example makes 
it clear that this is an important difference.
Case Study Five: Housewife
This final case study involves the participation of a housewife in 
an emergency evacuation shelter that operated for several weeks during 
the flooding of Fairbanks, Alaska in 1967. Kreps characterized this 
organization as an R-A-T-D form in his original study. The shelter 
operated out of a school building, and housed approximately 350 evacuees 
for over a week. The story of the participation of the housewife in this 
shelter is interesting in itself, and the unusual situations that it 
creates for the methodology make it an important case to be examined.
The housewife reports that she was a member of the local Civil 
Defense and participated on their disaster control and relief team. She 
was also a Red Cross volunteer, she taught first aid, was trained in 
judo, and taught firearm safety. Upon learning of the impending floods,
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she went to the local Civil Defense Office to find out if any of her 
services could be used in preparation for the floods. She was sent to 
the shelter, and when she arrived a microphone was given to her and she 
started to get people organized into sleeping areas. She spent most of 
that day getting the shelter organized. By the evening, all other 
workers had left and she was there alone and in charge, and she admits 
that she had no formal authority or position to be the shelter manager. 
That first night she watched the water level rise, and at three o'clock 
she decided that they should evacuate the first floor and move to 
classrooms on the second floor. Several hours were spent doing this.
The next day the husband of a nurse that had been working at the
shelter came to visit his wife. He felt that the shelter was
unorganized, and he decided that he would help lead it. He eventually 
became the primary leader of the group. It is clear from the interview 
with the housewife that she did not approve of his leadership. I 
characterized the housewife as an instrumental leader because she did 
begin getting the shelter organized during the first day. She was also 
an expressive leader, as noted by a frequent quote: "I wanted to make
these people feel like people again" (p.3). She said that she spent time 
helping the "natives" overcome their fear and sorrow.
When Mooney examined this respondent for her study, the housewife 
was considered a marginal leader. Other shelter members considered her 
a leader, but only because she was in constant conflict with the nurse's
husband. The others tell that the primary instrumental leader was the
nurse's husband, and that the housewife tried to take charge and only got 
in the way. Other members imply that she was in fact asked by the Red
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Cross to leave the shelter due to the conflict that existed between her 
and many of the other workers. It is no wonder that Mooney did not 
consider her an expressive leader; the other organization members made 
it clear that she was the cause of a great deal of conflict.
Mooney's study called for a judgment concerning conflict in the 
development of overall leadership in the organization, and when
considering this organization she noted that conflict did exist. For the 
present study, I noted that the housewife was involved in conflict over 
her own leadership, and that because of this there was conflict in the 
overall group leadership. The housewife was involved in conflict both 
in terms of the overall group and in terms of a sub-unit of the group. 
I made the judgment about the sub-unit because the housewife got into an 
argument with the recreation leader over activities that she did not 
approve of.
This case serves as an example of the growth of the first criterion. 
In Mooney's study the respondent's primary pre- occupational role,
housewife, was judged inconsistent with the role of shelter manager. In 
the present study, I have made the same judgment when considering her 
occupational role, but I noted that her nonoccupational role as a Red 
Cross volunteer was consistent with the shelter manager position. 
Although she was not specifically trained by the Red Cross to be a
shelter manager, she was a volunteer for both the Red Cross and the Civil
Defense, and considering all of her other community activities it seems 
that it would be within the scope of her relevant role to become involved 
in this emergent organization.
This case can also serve as an example of the changes made in the
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second criterion. I will discuss three of the links that she mentions 
in her interview in order to illustrate these changes. She mentions her 
connections with a professional Red Cross secretary who worked with the 
shelter, with her husband who acted as a "gopher", and with the Red Cross 
in general. Because Mooney examined internal links, the only one of 
these links that she judged was the link with the Red Cross secretary; 
the others were not considered part of the shelter organization. Mooney 
only examined occupational links, and therefore she judged the 
relationship between a housewife and a Red Cross secretary to be 
discontinuous. It cannot be assumed that housewives in general would be 
routinely linked with members of the Red Cross.
The extension of this criterion has enabled the researcher to 
develop a more accurate picture of role relationships. When first 
considering the occupational role, the role of housewife is compared to 
each of the links (Table 6). For this first comparison, the incumbent's 
occupational role is compared to the occupational roles of the role links. 
Again, a housewife cannot be assumed to be linked with a Red Cross 
employee. When considering the external links, the housewife's link with 
the gopher, her husband, is coded as uncertain, because his occupational 
role is unknown. This may seem strange, but the method intends to 
maintain a consistent comparison between occupational roles. Finally, 
housewives are not linked routinely with the Red Cross organization, so 
this link is judged as discontinuous.
The extension of the criterion allows an examination of relevant 
pre-disaster roles. Because the housewife's relevant pre-disaster role 
to her involvement in the shelter is as a Red Cross volunteer, her link
Table 6: Criterion 2 as coded for
Housewife/Red Cross Volunteer
Pre-disaster Occupational Role: HOUSEWIFE
INTERNAL 
Post-disaster Link
Link to roles:
1. Red Cross Secretary
EXTERNAL 
Post-disaster Link
Link to roles:
2. "Gopher"
Link to organizations:
3. Red Cross
Pre-disaster Link ( continuity')
(occupational role)
Red Cross Secretary N
Pre-disaster Link ( continuity)
Occupation Uncertain
Red Cross
U
N
Relevant Pre-disaster Role: RED CROSS VOLUNTEER
INTERNAL 
Post-disaster Link
Link to roles:
1. Red Cross Secretary
EXTERNAL 
Post-disaster Link
Pre-disaster Link (continuity)
(relevant role)
Red Cross Secretary
Pre-disaster Link (continuity)
Link to roles: 
2. "Gopher" Husband
Link to organizations:
3. Red Cross Red Cross Y
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with the Red Cross secretary is consistent. It is assumed that these 
roles would be linked on a routine basis. Because the gopher's relevant 
role when considering his relationship with the Red Cross
Volunteer/housewife is the role of husband, this relationship is judged 
continuous. Finally, the role of Red Cross volunteer would routinely be 
linked with the Red Cross, so this link is also continuous. This 
extension of the methodology to include relevant pre-disaster roles most 
definitely changes the results of criterion two, and I believe the 
changes enable the criterion to better reflect the reality of the role 
relationships.
Finally, it should be noted that I considered her role enactment to 
be role re-definition, which is the same judgment that was made by 
Mooney. We both considered her a new incumbent in the role of shelter 
manager. Because she had not been a trained shelter manager, and because 
she was not allowed to be in full control, her enactment can be 
considered role re-definition in terms of general knowledge. She was a 
Red Cross volunteer, and referred to her efforts to run the shelter 
according to Red Cross guidelines, but ran into difficulties with the 
other shelter leaders. Because the others would not allow her to take 
over and run the shelter "her way", by Red Cross guidelines, her 
enactment can also be categorized as role re-definition in terms of her 
individual role repertoire and her perception of her performance in that 
role.
This case, like the others, demonstrates that the different 
methodologies and approaches to the concept of role can yield very 
different results. I have coded this case in terms of the information
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that I got from her interview, and therefore in terms of how the 
respondent viewed her own participation in the disaster response 
organization. This is a very different perspective from that taken by 
Mooney, who was concerned with information gathered from many other group 1 
members, and used this other information to make her judgments.
FINDINGS PART TWO: METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
This section will describe the number and nature of the specific 
changes in the data collection process for those cases examined both in 
Mooney's and in the present study. Some of the changes involve simple 
differences between the judgments made by Mooney and myself. Any 
judgment changes have been discussed with Kreps and his associate 
Bosworth, and were determined to be a better way of describing the role 
enactments.
The more important changes are those that came about because of 
changes in the methodology. Fundamental differences as to how role 
enactments are judged occur as a result of differences between the two 
research methods. Several examples of the latter have been discussed 
already as a part of the case studies. I will proceed as by considering 
methodological differences within the leadership section, and then within 
each criterion.
The data used for this measurement of role enactment are derived 
from 57 participants in emergent disaster response organizations. 
Mooney's research involved the examination of over 100 interviews which 
gave information pertaining to 29 of Kreps's original 52 emergent 
organizations. For the present study I examined the interviews of 
members of the original 52 organizations. Respondents who gave enough 
information on their own role enactments were included in the data file.
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It happens that the 57 respondents participated in 29 different 
organizations; this should not be confused with Mooney's 29 cases. Some 
of the present respondents were used as informants in her study, but not 
all.
Because I was interested in learning more about role performance, 
I used several cases from organizations that were useless to Mooney, and 
several of the organizations that she examined provided no information 
for me. Many of the respondents gave information about their own 
participation; this information is what I sought. Many spoke only of the 
organization as a whole, and therefore their interviews told me nothing 
about their own role performance. This section describing data 
differences concerns only those participants that were examined both by 
Mooney and by myself. Of my sample of 57 respondents, 40 were examined 
also by Mooney.
When considering the leadership section of the methodology, there 
were a total of eight differences between the present data and Mooney's. 
Of these eight differences, seven were differences resulting from changes 
in the research method, while only one was due to a difference of 
researcher judgments. The judgment difference involved a newspaper 
manager who organized the printing of a newspaper following the tornado 
in a city in Kansas. He had to send printers to a town close by because 
there was no power and the press in his town could not be operated. He 
and the other reporters set up an office in a hotel near their damaged 
newspaper building. Mooney felt that he was not a leader, and I judged 
that he was an instrumental leader. Mooney reasoned that it was unclear 
as to what official authority or position he had, but from his interview
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I felt that it was clear that he played a leadership role in relocating 
the production of the newspaper, regardless of his official position.
The seven other differences resulted from changes that were made in 
the present methodology. By examining only the respondents' interview 
to gain information about role performances, different judgments were 
made concerning leadership positions. Three of these seven differences 
resulted from the manner in which Mooney and I judged instrumental 
leadership. When Mooney examined her 29 organizations, she was able to 
list all organization members and determine which one or ones were the 
primary leaders of that group. She examined internal leadership, and 
therefore only noted those individuals who led the disaster response as 
instrumental leaders. As mentioned in the methodology section, in the 
present study it was clear in some cases that participants were not 
leaders in the group, but most definitely were leaders in the community 
as it responded to the disaster. Although one person may have led and 
coordinated the organization, in some cases every organization member was 
a community disaster response leader.
The remaining four cases were different from Mooney's study because 
the individual perspective required that I not consider information given 
by other group members. In these cases, respondents considered 
themselves expressive or instrumental leaders, while none of the other 
organization members considered them leaders at all. When Mooney 
examined these organizations, if the consensus was that an individual 
was not a leader, he was not considered one. In the present study, if 
a respondent said that he was a leader in the organization, I noted this 
self-judgment.
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There were only two differences between how Mooney judged cases and 
how I did in the present study when considering the first criterion. One 
has been discussed fully already as the fourth case study, the case of 
the Director of the Department of Natural Resources. The only other case 
is that of a city manager who acted in an organization that evacuated 
residents during the southwest Colorado floods. Because Kreps 
characterized the organization as one specifically concerned with 
evacuation, I felt that the role of city manager was inconsistent with 
the role of evacuator. Mooney in her study felt that his role was 
consistent. This is a case that depends on the researcher's judgment. 
It was decided that inconsistent was a more accurate way to describe the 
city manager's role performance for this criterion in the present study. 
This judgment process itself illustrates one of the benefits of the 
present research; by constantly refining Mooney's measure and judgments 
we can better understand the complexities and needs of future research 
on role performance.
The second criterion will not be considered in this section. It has 
been extended in the present study, but because Mooney examined role 
relationships within organizations, the second criterion as calculated 
in the present study cannot be compared to her research.
The most differences between the two methodologies occur when 
considering the third criterion. Forty instances of organization 
participation were examined by myself and Mooney, and there are a total 
of thirteen differences between Mooney's and my own judgments of the 
individual respondents' role enactments. In one case a judgment of 
uncertain was made by Mooney, and in the present study it was felt that
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there was enough information given in the respondent's interview to make 
a judgment about his role enactment. Of the rest, eight of the 
differences are easily explained; they are simple disagreements as to the 
degree of innovation that the respondent was involved in. For these 
cases the type of enactment, whether role-playing or role-making, was 
agreed on.
An example of this is the case of the city engineer in a major city 
in Alaska, who acted as the city engineer of a much smaller city that had 
been destroyed almost completely following the Alaskan earthquake. The 
acting government of the small village asked the government of the 
neighboring city to take over the disaster response in their town. Not 
only did these men perform their occupational roles in a completely new 
location, the devastated town, but much of their efforts went into 
determining a better location on which to rebuild. Mooney felt that the 
city engineer was involved in working role enactment. I agree that he 
was role-playing, but I felt that his was a case of radical 
transformation. He held the same position, but in a smaller, destroyed 
town with very few resources. The seven other cases are similar; they 
involve simple disagreements as to the amount of innovation exhibited by 
the respondent.
There were four cases in which the role enactments were judged in 
radically different ways. In these cases, Mooney and I disagreed as to 
whether the respondent was role-playing or role- making. Two of these 
four were discussed as case studies: the Director of the Department of 
Natural Resources, and the Chairman of the Anchorage Emergency Health 
Services. All four of these differences are due to the different methods
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for determining role performance. Mooney's method only examined the 
pre-disaster occupational role when determining the incumbent's role 
enactment. In one case, a psychology professor coordinated the search 
and rescue efforts after the Alaska earthquake. Mooney judged this as 
role-making. When considering his whole role repertoire, I noted that 
his primary nonoccupational role was that of chairman of the local 
mountain rescue group. Because of his experience as a rescuer, I judged 
his enactment as role- playing.
My judgments account for how the individual conceived of his own 
role performance, while Mooney's account for how the whole group 
conceived of one participant's performance. In the final case, the mayor 
of a city felt that he was performing the appropriate duties following 
hurricane Betsy, so I judged his role performance as role-playing. 
Others in the group felt that he stepped beyond his authority, and 
therefore Mooney characterized his role performance as role-making.
This concludes the discussion of the differences that exist in the 
data between Mooney's and the present research. What follows is a 
discussion of the results of the present study, which will describe the 
role enactments of the emergent disaster response organization members.
FINDINGS PART THREE: SUMMARY OF DATA RESULTS
The section of the methodology concerned with the biographical 
information of the respondents yielded little information. The 
respondent's age was only known in eight cases; 86 percent of the cases 
were coded "uncertain" for this question. This uncertain category 
dominated when considering marital and parental status, length of time 
at residence, and personal disaster experience. This might be helpful 
information for future researchers concerned with role enactment in these 
types of organizations, but at the present these sorts of questions are 
not asked during interviews with disaster response participants. It is 
clear that most respondents were male (86 percent), and most reported to 
be residents of the area of the disasters' impact. Nearly half were 
victims themselves (47.4 percent).
Not much can be concluded from the section concerning expressive 
leadership. Only six respondents were coded as expressive leaders, 
amounting to only 10.5 percent. Again, this concept was not approached 
directly in the interviews, so these few respondents were determined to 
be expressive leaders by whatever information the researcher judged 
relevant.
Many of the respondents in the present study were considered 
instrumental leaders. Respondents were determined to be instrumental 
leaders either in sub-units of the organization (21.1 percent) or in the
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overall organization (52.6 percent). This finding is very interesting 
when compared to the number of incumbents who were characterized as 
instrumental in Mooney's study. She recorded a total of 866 organization 
members. This number comes from her efforts to compile lists of all 
organization participants from the interviews she used; it does not 
imply that she examined 866 interviews! Only 25 of those members were 
characterized as instrumental leaders; only 34.6 percent of the
incumbents in her study. Because I focused only on the interviewees, it 
seems that most Disaster Research Center interviews are taken with 
disaster response leaders. This is logical, and it explains the large 
percentage of instrumental leaders in the present study. Also, the 
present study accounted for both internal and external leaders, which was 
an extension of Mooney's research method.
The final section of the leadership methodology, the conflict
section, does not yield valuable information for the present study. Of
the respondents, 78.9 percent had no conflict in their personal
leadership, and 82.5 percent identified no conflict in the leadership of 
the overall group. Natural disasters are by nature consensus events; 
this may help explain the low degrees of conflict within these 
organizations. When disasters occur, people seem to respond by working 
together, and therefore conflict is not common within such disaster
response groups (Kreps, 1984).
Having read the interviews, it is not surprising to learn that 66.7 
percent of the respondents' motivations for their disaster response 
involvement was relevant to their pre-disaster occupational roles. 
Considering criterion one, 59.6 percent of the respondents' primary
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post-disaster roles were consistent with their pre-disaster primary 
occupational roles (Table 7). Because six out of ten of the respondents 
had ratings of consistent when comparing pre-disaster occupational roles, 
it is likely that occupation is a primary motivational factor for 
response involvement; this seems to have been true for the present 
sample. The scores for the additional categories, secondary occupation 
and nonoccupation, tell little because they were not applicable for most 
respondents.
Mooney's consistency score for incumbents was slightly higher than 
the score given by the present data; she found that 67.3 percent of the 
incumbents in her study had post-disaster roles that were consistent with 
their pre-disaster primary occupation. The foci of the two studies were 
different, but both seem to show a predominance of consistency when 
comparing pre- disaster occupational roles to post-disaster roles. This 
consistency can be attributed to the fact that all of the disasters 
studied by the Disaster Research Center occurred in the United States. 
The disasters that have occurred in recent history in the United States 
have had low impacts, and therefore have not been socially disruptive 
(Kreps, 1984). Participants were not normally forced to assume roles that 
were inconsistent with their occupational roles because the disasters 
were not highly disruptive.
Criterion two is concerned with the continuity of role linkages, and 
the present methodology has distinguished between internal and external 
links, links with roles and with organizations, and finally links with 
the incumbent's pre-disaster occupational role and with any other relevant 
pre-disaster role. The respondents reported an average of 13.9 internal 
links and four external links, accounting for both role and
TABLE 7: Criterion One
Consistency of Pre-disaster Occupational Role and 
Post-Disaster Role
Frequency Percent Role
Consistent 34 59.6%
Inconsistent 22 38.6%
Uncertain  1 1. 8%
57 100.0%
TABLE 8: Criterion Two:
Continuity of Pre-disaster Occupational Role and 
Post-disaster Role and Organization Relationships
Internal Links External Links
Freq.
Role
Continuous 349
Discontinuous 83
Uncertain 35
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Organization
Continuous 11
Discontinuous 22
Uncertain  1
34
Perc. Freq. Perc.
74.7% 36 45.0%
17.4% 37 46.3%
7.3%  7 8.8%
100.0% 80 100.0%
32.4% 58 39.5%
64.7% 87 59.2%
2.9%  2 1.4%
100.0% 147 100.0%
Role
Continuous
Discontinuous
Uncertain
Organization
Continuous
Discontinuous
Uncertain
Total Links
Freq. Perc.
385 70.3%
120 21.9%
42 7.7%
547 100.0%
69 38.1%
109 60.2%
3 1.7%
181 100.0%
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organizational links. Table eight shows the frequencies and percentages 
for post-disaster role links with the incumbent's pre-disaster 
occupational role. Approximately 75 percent of the internal role links 
with the incumbents' pre-disaster occupational role were continuous. 
This is the only category in the present study that is comparable to 
Mooney's examination of the second criterion, and the results are very 
different from those given by her data.
In her thesis, Mooney reports that only 35 percent of the links were 
continuous, while 40 percent were discontinuous. Again it is essential 
to remember that she examined all organization members. If many of the 
actual respondents were leaders, it may be that those individuals who 
emerge as response leaders are those who tend to have a greater number 
of continuous links with the participants of the organization. It seems 
logical that the leader or leaders of an emergent group would be those 
persons who had continuous role relationships with other group members.
The data show that the percentage of external role links, unlike the 
internal role links, is fairly even. When considering organizational 
links, it appears that most are discontinuous, both internally and 
externally. It is interesting to note that when the frequencies are 
combined into the totals table, role links are shown usually to be 
continuous, while organizational links are shown usually to be 
discontinuous. The data suggest that as such organizations emerge, they 
are grounded, in part, on the continuity of the key participants' roles. 
Organizational links may be less continuous because of the fact that the 
organization itself is emerging and creating its own new structure, one 
that is new and independent of other organizations.
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There were only nine cases for which the incumbent's pre- disaster 
secondary occupational role or nonoccupational role were considered 
relevant to the disaster response. Thirty-eight respondents'
occupational roles were relevant, and ten respondents had no pre-disaster 
role that was relevant to the response. The data for the comparisons of 
role and organization links with the pre-disaster relevant roles are very 
similar to the data that compares the occupational roles. As 
anticipated, the relevant role comparison shows more continuity. The 
percentage increases from 74.7 to 80.1 percent when considering internal 
continuous role links. Because the researcher used whatever role was 
relevant to the link, more continuous linkages were recorded than when 
simply considering the occupational role.
Again the paradox of action and order is evidenced by the results 
of this criterion. The impetus for this study was a desire to examine 
emergent disaster response organization participants on an individual 
level in order to account for much of the action, in terms of innovative 
performance and role-making, that Mooney felt was being overlooked by her 
methodology. Our attempt to more fully record the links of these
participants has created a result which suggests higher degrees of 
continuity among the participants than was originally conceived in terms 
of their occupational roles.
Criterion three attempts to make judgments concerning incumbent role 
enactment both in terms of a general perspective and the perspective of 
the respondent. It is first concerned with how the role performance 
would be characterized in terms of the general knowledge about the role's 
requirements and the actor's role repertoire, knowledge, and experience.
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The criterion then considers how the role performance is perceived by 
the actor himself, which requires an interpretation of the respondent's 
description of his post-disaster activities. The scores for role-playing 
remain constant, but it is interesting to note the four changes in the 
scores for role-making. These changes are important, but they do not 
suggest that the two perspectives reveal very differing outcomes.
Table nine shows that 56.1 percent of the respondents were involved 
in some form of role-playing. Instances of role-playing and role-making 
appear evenly in the data. It appears that the judgments made in terms 
of general knowledge lean toward higher degrees of innovation, while 
respondents perceive their enactments as less innovative; this was true 
in three cases. It is interesting that the researcher's conception of 
how incumbents' role enactments would generally be seen is more 
innovative. There is one major exception to this slight trend: the
bio-chemist who was described in the third case study.
Mooney's data indicate that 54.8 percent of the organization members 
were involved in role-playing. This is consistent with my finding of 
56.1 percent. The remaining cases in my study involved role-making, but 
in Mooney's study she recorded 12.2 percent uncertain judgments of role 
enactment. She had uncertain scores because she did not have complete 
information for each incumbent, whereas the present incumbent study only 
examined those respondent cases which offered complete information.
I finally turn to the scale of innovation (Table 10). Its scores 
are derived easily from the role enactment scores. The scores for 
general knowledge have been used. Level one indicates the lowest degree 
of innovation and is composed of formal role enactment and role prototype 
enactment. Level two is made up of working role enactment and role
TABLE 9: Criterion Three
Perspective:
General Respondent
Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc.
Role-Plaving
Formal Role Enactment 10 17.5% 10 17..5%
Working Role Enactment 13 22.8% 13 22..8%
Radical Transformation 9 15.8% 9 15..8%
Subtotal: 32 56.1% 32 56..1%
Role-Making
Role Prototype Enactment 5 8.8% 8 14.0%
Role Re-definition 18 31.6% 14 24.6%
Radical Role Re-definition 2 3.5% 2 3.5%
Role Invention - - 1 1.8%
Subtotal: 25 43.9% 25 43.9%
Total: 57 100.0% 57 100.0%
TABLE 10: Innovation Scale
Frea. Perc
Level One
Formal Role Enactment 15 26.3
Role Prototype Enactment 
Level Two
Working Role Enactment 31 54.4
Role Re-definition 
Level Three
Radical Transformation 11 19.3
Radical Role Re-definition 
Level Four
Role Invention
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re-definition, level three is made up of radical transformation and 
radical role re-definition, and level four, role invention, is the 
outlier. The scale shows that the second level of moderate innovation 
occurs most frequently in the present data.
It is very interesting that in Mooney's study nearly 60 percent of 
the incumbents were characterized as having the lowest degree of 
innovation. Our data are not comparable, but these findings do suggest 
that Mooney's organizational approach and the present individual approach 
do yield differences in terms of scores of innovation. These differences 
most likely result from the type of respondents that are interviewed 
routinely, and that are therefore represented in the present data.
IMPLICATIONS
The data illustrate that the emergent disaster response 
organization participants enacted roles that usually were consistent with 
their pre-disaster roles, specifically their occupational roles. This 
implies that, as Mooney found, there is "a trend toward fulfillment of 
role expectations" (Mooney, 1989:81) for incumbents in these 
organizations.
Incumbent role links tend to be continuous, while organizational 
links tend to be discontinuous. In part, this may be a result of the 
nature of the emergent organizations. The latter may be grounded in the 
role relationships of their members because these links are their most 
useful and readily available resources. At the same time, the roles may 
be linked to organizations different from those to which they are linked 
typically because the disaster setting involves unique circumstances and 
response requirements. The emergent organization may be linked by its 
incumbents' roles to other organizations in order to respond adequately 
to the unusual circumstances.
The data contain a nearly equal number of instances of role-playing 
and role-making. Although most of the incumbents performed consistent 
roles and had many continuous role links, only half were performing their 
primary pre-disaster role. This suggests that even when role-making, 
incumbents may often perform roles that are consistent with their
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pre-disaster roles, or that are linked to roles with which they are 
linked routinely pre-disaster.
Finally, the respondents from the present study were most often 
engaged in moderate innovation, regardless of whether they were new 
incumbents in their post-disaster roles or not.
The goal of this thesis has been to examine the same type of data 
that Mooney did, but from the perspective of the individual, thus adding 
to the growth and strength of the methodology. The differences between 
the methods and results of the two studies add further to an 
understanding of the process of role enactment in these emergent disaster 
response organizations. The examination of the individual respondents 
did take the methodology further than it had been before. Much was added 
in order to better measure individual role enactment.
Mooney's data revealed that organization members were generally 
involved in role-playing. The exception was criterion two, for which 
there was a slightly greater percentage of discontinuous links. The 
present study would generally support Mooney's findings, except that it 
seems to have taken one more step in the direction of innovation; the 
number of consistent roles was not as high, and there was less 
role-playing. Generally, though, the findings were similar.
Future disaster field research could add to an understanding of role 
enactment by integrating some of the unanswered questions into the data 
collection process. Both Mooney's study and the present had to make 
judgments about questions that could be answered easily by future 
respondents. Finally, the next logical step for Kreps's research program 
would be an examination of established organizations using these two
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refined methodologies. A comparison between two respondent studies, one 
based on established organizations and one based on emergent, might yield 
interesting results that would tell of the differences between those two 
types of organizations.
APPENDIX A 
(CODEBOOK: MOONEY)
ITEM COLUMNS
Organized disaster response number: RESPN 
Event number: EVENT
3 (1-3)
2 (4-5)
1 = Fairbanks flood 12 = Jonesboro tornado
2 = Alaska earthquake 13 = Oaklawn tornado
3 = Topeka tornado 14 = Jackson tornado
4 = Hurricane Betsy 15 = Hurricane Camille
5 = Belmond tornado 16 = Xenia tornado
6 = Fargo floods 17 = Lake Pomona tornado
7 = Mankato floods 18 = Wichita Falls tornado
8 = Minot floods 19 = Cheyenne tornado
9 = Minneapolis tornado 20 = Texas floods
10 = St Paul floods 21 = Hurricane Frederic
11 = Colorado floods 22 = Mount St Helens eruption
23 = Wilkes Barre flood
Event type: EVENTTP 1 (6)
1 = earthquake
2 = tornado
3 = flood
4 - hurricane
5 = volanic eruption
Post-disaster domain type: DOMTYPE 2 (7-8)
1 = hazard-vulnerability analysis
2 = maintenance of standby human and material resources
3 = disaster preparedness, planning, and training
4 = public education
5 = hazard mitigation-structural
6 = hazard mitigation-nonstructural
7 = insurance
8 = issuance of predictions and warnings
9 = dissemination of predictions and warnings
10 = evacuation
11 = mobilization of emergency personnel
12 = protective action
13 = search and rescue
14 = medical care
15 = provision of victim basic needs
(food, clothing, shelter)
16 = damage and needs assessments and inventory
of available resources
17 = damage control
18 = restoration of essential public services
19 = public information
20 = traffic control
21 = law enforcement
22 - local governance
23 = coordination and control (organization of
emergency personnel and resources)
24 = reconstruction of physical structures
25 = re-establishment of production, distribution,
and consumption activities (economic functioning)
26 = resumption of other social institutions
27 = determination of responsibility and legal
liability for the event
28 = reconstruction planning
29 = care of fatalities
30 = communications
31 = other
99 = uncertain
Elemental form of organization: FORM 2 (9-10)
1 = DTRA 9 = TADR 17 = RTDA
2 = DTAR 10 = TARD 18 = RTAD
3 DRAT 11 = TDRA 19 = ADTR
4 = DRTA 12 = TDAR 20 = ADRT
5 = DATR 13 = RADT 21 = ATDR
6 = DART 14 = RATD 22 = ATRD
7 = TRAD 15 - RDTA 23 = ARDT
8 = TRDA 16 = RDAT 24 = ARTD
Domain problem: DOMPR 1 (11)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:
Domain problem onset: DONSET 1 (12)
0 = no problem present
1 = problem present, onset at
maintenance
2 = problem present, onset at origins 
9 = uncertain
Task problem: TASKPR 1 (13)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:
Task problem onset: TONSET 1 (14)
0 = no problem present
1 = problem present, onset at
maintenance 
2 = problem present, onset at origins 
9 = uncertain
Resource problem: RESPR 1 (15)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:
Resource problem onset: RONSET 1 (16)
0 = no problem present
1 = problem present, onset at
maintenance
2 = problem present, onset at origins 
9 = uncertain
Activities problem: ACTPR 1 (17)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:
Activities problem onset: AONSET 1 (18)
0 = no problem present
1 = problem present, onset at
maintenance
2 = problem present, onset at origins 
9 = uncertain
Type of enacting unit: UNITYPE 1 (19)
1 = emergency relevant public bureaucracy
2 = other public bureaucracy
3 = emergency relevant voluntary agency
4 = special interest group
5 = private firm
6 = emergent group of individuals
7 = emergent group of other groups
and organizations
8 = military unit
9 = other
Response task structure: RTSTR 1 (20)
1 = simple (1-3)
2 = complex (more than 3) 
9 = uncertain
Social network relevance of responding 1 (21)
unit at initiation: ILINKS
1 = self contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 = boundary spanning national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 = boundary spanning-mixed local, state, and national
9 = uncertain
Time initiation network established: ITLINKS 1 (22)
1 = established prior to disaster
2 = emergent
3 = mixed established and emergent
4 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Number of network links at 1 (23)
initiation: INLINKS
0 = none
1 = 1 - 3
2 = more than 3 
9 = uncertain
Social network relevance of responding 1 (24)
unit at maintenance: MLINKS
1 = self contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 = boundary spanning national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 = boundary spanning-mixed local, state, and national
9 = uncertain
Time network at maintenance established: MTLINKS 1 (25)
1 = established prior to disaster
2 = emergent
3 = mixed established and emergent
4 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Number of network links at 1 (26)
maintenance: MNLINKS
0 = none
1 = 1 - 3
2 = more than 3 
9 = uncertain
Evidence of pre-planning prior to response: PLANN 1 (27)
1 = no pre-planning
2 = pre-planning evidenced 
9 = uncertain
Size of focal organization: SIZ 1 (28)
1 = 9 or fewer
2 =  10 -  20
3 = 21 - 50
4 = over 50
9 = uncertain
Community disaster experience in past 1 (29)
10 years: C-EXP
1 = no disasters, few if any threats
2 = no disasters, several threats
3 = one or more disasters
4 = one or more disasters and several threats 
9 = uncertain
Community (rural-urban): COMM 1 (30)
1 = rural area
2 = urban 10,000 or less
3 = urban 10,001 - 25,000
4 = urban 25,001 - 50,000
5 = urban metropolitan, 50,000+
Time of initiation: INTIME 3 (31-33)
Time of initiation in hours from impact:
999 = uncertain
Role Criteria
Number of post-disaster role incumbents 
identified: INCUMBS
3 (34-36)
Number of post-disaster roles identified: ROLES 2 (37-38)
Criterion 1
Number of pre- and post-disaster role 
incumbents consistent: C1IYES
3 (39-41)
Number of pre- and post-disaster role 
incumbents inconsistent: C1IN0
3 (42-44)
Number of pre- and post-disaster role incumbent 
consistency-inconsistency uncertain: C1IUNC
3 (45-47)
Number of pre- and post-disaster roles 2 (48-49)
consistent: C1RYES
Number of pre- and post-disaster roles 
inconsistent: C1RN0
2 (50-51)
Number of pre- and post-disaster role 2 (52-53)
consistency-inconsistency evenly mixed: C1RMIX
Number of pre- and post-disaster 2 (54-55)
role consistency-inconsistency uncertain: C1RUNC
Criterion 2
Number of post-disaster role incumbents linked 4 (1-4)
by pre-disaster occupational roles: C2IYES
Number of post-disaster role incumbents not 4 (5-8)
linked by pre-disaster occupational roles: C2INO
Number of post-disaster role incumbents linked 4 (9-12)
by pre-disaster occupational roles
uncertain: C2IUNC
Number of post-disaster role pairs linked 2 (13-14)
by pre-disaster occupational role pairs 
(sensitive to number of incumbents): C2RSIYES
Number of post-disaster role pairs not linked 2 (15-16)
by pre-disaster occupational role pairs 
(sensitive to number of incumbents): C2RSIN0
Number of post-disaster role pairs linked-not 2 (17-18)
linked by pre-disaster occupational role pairs 
evenly mixed (sensitive to number of 
incumbents): C2RSIMIX
Number of post-disaster role pairs linked 2 (19-20)
by pre-disaster occupational role pairs uncertain 
(sensitive to number of incumbents): C2RSIUNC
Criterion 3
Number of instances of formal role 3 (21-23)
enactment: FORMAL
Number of instances of working role 3 (24-26)
enactment: WORKING
Number of instances of radical 3 (27-29)
transformation: RADTRANS
Number of instances of role prototype 3 (30-32)
enactment: PROTOTYP
Number of instances of role 3 (33-35)
re-definition: REDEFINE
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Number of instances of radical role 3 (36-38)
re-definition: RADREDEF
Number of instances of role 3 (39-41)
invention: INVENT
Number of instances in which role performance 3 (42-44)
could not be categorized: UNCERT
Leadership
Number of instrumental leaders identified: ILEAD 2 (45-46)
Number of expressive leaders identified: ELEAD 2 (47-48)
Differentiation of instrumental and expressive 1 (49)
leaders: DIFFLEAD
0 = no instrumental and/or expressive leaders
identified
1 =* instrumental and expressive leaders
not differentiated
2 = instrumental and expressive leaders
differentiated .
3 = instrumental and expressive leaders mixed
differentiated and not differentiated 
9 = uncertain
Number of boundary spanning roles 2 (50-51)
identified: BOUNDARY
99 = uncertain
Leadership involvement in boundary spanning 1 (52)
roles: BOUNLEAD
0 = no boundary spanning roles identified
1 = boundary spanning roles not performed by instrumental
or expressive leaders
2 — . boundary spanning roles performed by instrumental leaders only
3 = boundary spanning roles performed by expressive leaders only
4 = boundary spanning roles performed by both instrumental
and expressive leaders
5 = boundary spanning roles performed by instrumental and/or
expressive leaders and others 
9 = uncertain
Conflict in developing of leadership: CONLEAD 1 (53)
0 = no conflict identified
1 = conflict identified 
9 = uncertain
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Criterion #1 Worksheet
Inconsistency vs consistency of pre- and post-disaster status/role
Post-disaster Pre-disaster Roles Consistency of
Role________ N Occupational / Relevant others Status /Role Nexus
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Criterion #2 Worksheet
Discontinuity vs continuity of pre- and post-impact role relationships
Post-disaster Pre-disaster Continuity of
Role Relationships Role Relationships Role Relationships
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Criterion #3 Worksheet
Unique role performance versus role boundary expansion
Role Context: Collective--does role exist locally? (Y/N)
Individual-- is it available to individual? (Y/N)
Role-Playing:
Formal role enactment 
(role exists, no change in 
incumbent, consistant performance)
N N
(roles) (incumbents)
Working role enactment 
(role exists, no change in 
incumbent, improvised performance)
Radical transformation
(role exists, no change in incumbent,
fundamental change in performance)
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N
(incumbents) 
Role-Making:
Role prototype enactment
(role exists, change in incumbent,
consistent performance)
Role re-definition 
(role exists, change in 
incumbent, improvised performance)
Radical role re-definition 
(role exists, change in incumbent, 
fundamental change in performance)
N
(roles)
Role invention
(role does not exist, new
incumbent, new performance)
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Leadership Worksheet
Leadership role enactment Boundary spanning role Leadership
(instrumental/expressive) negotiated
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APPENDIX B 
(CODEBOOK: RUSSELL)
ITEM COLUMNS
Respondent Number: ID
Interviews:
Organized disaster response number: RESPN
Event number: EVENT
4 (1-4)
3 (5-7)
2 (8-9)
1 == Fairbanks flood 12 - Jonesboro tornado
2 = Alaska earthquake 13 = Oaklawn tornado
3 = Topeka tornado 14 = Jackson tornado
4 = Hurricane Betsy 15 = Hurricane Camille
5 = Belmond tornado 16 = Xenia tornado
6 = Fargo floods 17 = Lake Pomona tornado
7 = Mankato floods 18 = Wichita Falls tornado
8 = Minot floods 19 = Cheyenne tornado
9 = Minneapolis tornado 20 = Texas floods
10 = St Paul floods 21 = Hurricane Frederic
11 = Colorado floods 22 = Mount St Helens eruption
23 = Wilkes Barre flood
Event type: EVENTTP 1 (10)
1 = earthquake
2 = tornado
3 = flood
4 = hurricane
5 = volanic eruption
Post-disaster domain type: DOMTYPE 2 (11-12)
1 = hazard-vulnerability analysis
2 = maintenance of standby human and material resources
3 = disaster preparedness, planning, and training
4 = public education
5 = hazard mitigation-structural
6 = hazard mitigation-nonstructural
7 = insurance
8 = issuance of predictions and warnings
9 = dissemination of predictions and warnings
10 = evacuation
11 = mobilization of emergency personnel
12 = protective action
13 = search and rescue
14 = medical care
15 = provision of victim basic needs
(food, clothing, shelter)
16 = damage and needs assessments and inventory
of available resources
17 = damage control
18 = restoration of essential public services
19 = public information
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20 = traffic control
21 = law enforcement
22 = local governance
23 = coordination and control (organization of
emergency personnel and resources)
24 = reconstruction of physical structures
25 = re-establishment of production, distribution,
and consumption activities (economic functioning)
26 = resumption of other social institutions
27 = determination of responsibility and legal
liability for the event
28 = reconstruction planning
29 = care of fatalities
30 = communications
31 = other
99 = uncertain
Elemental form of organization: FORM 2 (13-14)
1 = DTRA 9 = TADR 17 = RTDA
2 = DTAR 10 - TARD 18 RTAD
3 = DRAT 11 = TDRA 19 = ADTR
4 = DRTA 12 = TDAR 20 - ADRT
5 = DATR 13 = RADT 21 - ATDR
6 = DART 14 = RATD 22 = ATRD
7 = TRAD 15 - RDTA 23 = ARDT
8 = TRDA 16 = RDAT 24 = ARTD
Domain problem: DOMPR 1 (15)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain 
Description:
Task problem: TASKPR 1 (16)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain 
Description:
Resource problem: RESPR 1 (17)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain 
Description:
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Activities problem: ACTPR 1 (18)
0 = absent
1 = present
9 = uncertain 
Description:
Type of enacting unit: UNITYPE 1 (19)
1 = emergency relevant public bureaucracy
2 = other public bureaucracy
3 = emergency relevant voluntary agency
4 = special interest group
5 = private firm
6 = emergent group of individuals
7 = emergent group of other groups
and organizations
8 = military unit
9 = other
Response task structure: RTSTR 1 (20)
1 = simple (1-3)
2 = complex (more than 3)
9 = uncertain
Social network relevance of responding 1 (21)
unit at initiation: ILINKS
1 = self contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 = boundary spanning national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 — boundary spanning-mixed local, state, and national
9 = uncertain
Time initiation network established: ITLINKS 1 (22)
1 = established prior to disaster
2 = emergent
3 = mixed established and emergent
4 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Number of network links at 1 (23)
initiation: INLINKS
0 = none
1 = 1 - 3
2 = more than 3
9 = uncertain
Social network relevance of responding 1 (24)
unit at maintenance: MLINKS
1 = self contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 = boundary spanning national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 = boundary spanning-mixed local, state, and national
9 = uncertain
Time network at maintenance established: MTLINKS 1 (25)
1 — established prior to disaster
2 = emergent
3 = mixed established and emergent
4 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Number of network links at 1 (26)
maintenance: MNLINKS
0 = none
1 = 1 - 3
2 = more than 3 
9 = uncertain
Evidence of pre-planning prior to response: PLANN 1 (27)
1 = no pre-planning
2 = pre-planning evidenced 
9 = uncertain
Size of focal organization: SIZ 1 (28)
1 = 9 or fewer
2 =  10 - 20
3 = 21 - 50
4 = over 50
9 = uncertain
Community disaster experience in past 1 (29)
10 years: C-EXP
1 = no disasters, few if any threats
2 = no disasters, several threats
3 = one or more disasters
4 = one or more disasters and several threats 
9 = uncertain
Community (rural-urban) : COMM 1 (30)
1 = rural area
2 = urban 10,000 or less
3 = urban 10,001 - 25,000
4 = urban 25,001 - 50,000
5 = urban metropolitan, 50,000+
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Personal Biography
Age: AGE 2 (31-32)
99 = uncertain
Gender: SEX 1 (33)
1 = male
2 = female
Marital status: MARRIED 1 (34)
0 = single 3 = divorced
1 = married 4 = widowed
2 = separated 9 = uncertain
Parental status: PARENT 1 (35)
0 = not a parent
1 = parent
9 = uncertain
Residence: WHERELIV 1 (36)
0 = local
1 = state
2 = national
3 = international
9 = uncertain
Length of time at residence-in years: TIMELIV 2 (37-38)
99 = uncertain
Personal disaster experience: PEREXP 1 (39)
0 = no
1 = yes
9 = uncertain
Victim in current disaster: VICTIM 1 (40)
0 = no
1 = yes
2 = no, but relative of victim(s)
3 = no, but friend of victim(s)
9 = uncertain
Primary motivation for response 1 (41) _
involvement: MOTIVE
1 = relevant to primary occupational role
2 = relevant to secondary occupational role
3 = relevant to primary nonoccupational role
4 = proximity to impacted area
5 = altruism
6 = as victim
7 = other
9 = uncertain
Tenure in primary occupational role 2 (42-43)
(in years): TENURE1 
99 = uncertain
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Tenure in secondary occupational role 
(in years): TENURE2 
00 = not applicable 
99 = uncertain
Tenure in primary nonoccupational role 
(in years): TENURE3 
00 = not applicable 
99 = uncertain
Time of initiation of respondent in overall 
disaster response: TIME1
Time of initiation in, hours from impact:
999 = uncertain
Length of respondent involvement in overall 
disaster response (in hours): TIME2 
999 = uncertain
Time of initiation of organized response: TIME3 
Time of initiation in hours from impact:
999 = uncertain
Time of initiation of respondent in 
organized response: TIME4
Time of initiation in hours from impact:
999 = uncertain
Length of respondent involvement in organized 
response (in hours): TIME5 
999 = uncertain
Leadership
Instrumental leader: LEAPT
0 = no
1 = yes, in sub-unit of organizational response
2 = yes, in overall organizational response 
9 = uncertain
Expressive leader: LEADE
0 = no
1 = yes, in sub-unit of organizational response
2 = yes, in overall organizational response 
9 = uncertain
Conflict in respondent leadership: LEADCQN1
0 =» no conflict identified
1 — conflict identified in sub-unit leadership
2 = conflict identified in overall leadership
3 = conflict identified in both sub-unit
and overall leadership
8 = respondent not in leaership role
9 = uncertain
2 (44-45)
2 (46-47)
3 (48-50) 
(51-53)
(54-56) 
(57-59)
(60-62) 
(63) _
(64) _  
(65)
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Conflict in organizational leadership: LEADCON2 1 (66)
0 = no conflict identified
1 — conflict identified in sub-unit leadership
2 = conflict identified in overall leadership
3 = conflict identified in both sub-unit
and overall leadership 
9 = uncertain
ROLE CRITERIA 
Criterion 1
Consistency of primary occupational role: C1PRIM 1 (1)___
0 = inconsistent
1 = consistent
2 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Consistency of secondary occupational role: C1SEC 1 (2) _
0 = inconsistent
1 = consistent
2 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Consistency of primary nonoccupational role: C1V0L 1 (3) _
0 = inconsistent
1 = consistent
2 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
CRITERION 2
Total number of post-disaster internal links to 3 (4-6) _
primary disaster role: C2INT
Total number of post-disaster external links to 3 (7-9) _
primary disaster role: C2EXT
INTERNAL - PRIMARY OCCUPATIONAL ROLE - ROLE LINK
Number of internal links to identified role 3 (10-12)
continuous (primary occupational): C2I0RY
Number of internal links to identified role 3 (13-15) ___
discontinuous (primary occupational): C2I0RN
Continuity of internal links to identified role 3 (16-18) ___
uncertain (primary occupational): C2I0RU
INTERNAL - PRIMARY OCCUPATIONAL ROLE - ORGANIZATION LINK
Number of internal links to another organization 3 (19-21) _
continuous (primary occupational): C2I00Y
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Number of internal links to another organization 3 (22-24) 
discontinuous (primary occupational): C2I00N
Continuity of internal links to another 3 (25-27)
organization uncertain (primary occupational): C2I00U
EXTERNAL - PRIMARY OCCUPATIONAL ROLE 
Number of external links to individual role
- ROLE LINK 
3 (25-27)
continuous (primary occupational): C2E0RY
Number of external links to individual role 3 (28-30)
discontinuous (primary occupational): C2E0RN
Continuity of external links to individual role 3 (31-33)
uncertain (primary occupational): C2E0RU
EXTERNAL - PRIMARY OCCUPATIONAL ROLE - ORGANIZATION LINK
Number of external links to another organization 3 (34-36)
continuous (primary occupational): C2E00Y
Number of external links to another organization 3 (37-39)
discontinuous (primary occupational): C2E00N
Continuity of external links to another organization3 (40-42)
uncertain (primary occupational): C2E00U
Respondent primary relevant pre-disaster role: RELR0LE1 (43)
0 = pre-disaster role(s) not relevant to response
1 = primary occupational role relevant to response
2 = secondary occupational role relevant to response
3 = volunteer/nonoccupational role relevant to response
4 = other
9 = uncertain
INTERNAL - RELEVANT ROLE - RELEVANT ROLE LINK
Number of internal links to relevant role 3 (44-46)
continuous (relevant role): C2IRRY
Number of internal links to relevant role 3 (47-49)
discontinuous (relevant role): C2IRRN
Continuity of internal links to relevant role 3 (50-52)
uncertain (relevant role): C2IRRU
INTERNAL - RELEVANT ROLE - ORGANIZATION LINK
Number of internal links to another organization 3 (53-55)
continuous (relevant role): C2IR0Y
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Number of internal links to another organization 3 (56-58)
discontinuous (relevant role): C2IR0N
Continuity of internal links to another 3 (59-61)
organization uncertain (relevant role): C2IR0U
EXTERNAL - RELEVANT ROLE - RELEVANT ROLE LINK
Number of external links to relevant role 3 (62-64)
continuous (relevant role): C2ERRY
Number of external links to relevant role 3 (65-67)
discontinuous (relevant role): C2ERRN
Continuity of external links to relevant role 3 (68-70)
uncertain (relevant role): C2ERRU
EXTERNAL - RELEVANT ROLE - ORGANIZATION LINK
Number of external links to another organization 3- (71-73)
continuous (relevant role): C2ER0Y
Number of external links to another organization 3 (74-76)
discontinuous (relevant role): C2ER0N
Continuity of external links to another organization3 (77-79) 
uncertain (relevant role): C2ER0U
Criterion 3
General knowledge and type of role 1 (1)  
enactment: C3GEN
1 = formal role enactment
2 = working role enactment
3 = radical transformation
4 = role prototype enactment
5 = role re-definition
6 = radical role re-definition
7 = role invention 
9 = uncertain
Post-disaster role involves specialized 1 (2) _
knowledge/training: C3SPEC
0 = no
1 = yes
9 = uncertain
Degress of respondent's specialized 1 (3)
knowledge/training of role: C3SPECR
0 = no specialized knowledge
1 = some specialized knowledge
2 = part of relevant pre-disaster role repertoire
3 = other
9 = uncertain
Ill
Individual role repertoire and type of 1 (4)
role enactment: C3IND
1 = formal role enactment
2 = working role enactment
3 = radical transformation
4 = role prototype enactment
5 = role re-definition
6 = radical role re-definition
7 = role invention 
9 = uncertain
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Criterion #1 Worksheet 
Inconsistency vs consistency of pre- and post-disaster status/role
Primary post-disaster (organizational) role:
Pre-disaster roles (consistency with post-disaster role) 
Primary occupational (and tenure):
Secondary occupational (and tenure):
Relevant nonoccupational role(s) (and tenure):
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Criterion #2 Worksheet 
(Based on Pre-disaster Primary Occupational Role)
Discontinuity vs continuity of pre- and post-impact role relationships
Respondent's primary occupational role:
INTERNAL
Post-disaster Link Pre-disaster Role (Continuity)
EXTERNAL
Post-disaster Link Pre-disaster Role 
or Organization
(Continuity)
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Criterion #2 Worksheet 
(Based on Pre-disaster Relevant Role)
Discontinuity vs continuity of pre- and post-impact role relationships
Respondent's relevant pre-disaster role:
INTERNAL
Post-disaster Link Pre-disaster Relevant (Continuity)
(or Occupational when 
no relevant role)
EXTERNAL
Post-disaster Link Pre-disaster Relevant (Continuity)
Role or Organization 
(or occupational role 
when no relevant role)
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Criterion #3 Worksheet 
Unique role performance versus role boundary expansion 
Role-Playing:
Formal role enactment (role exists, no change in 
incumbent, consistant performance)
Working role enactment (role exists, no change in 
incumbent, improvised performance)
Radical transformation (role exists, no change in incumbent, 
fundamental change in performance)
Role-Making:
Role prototype enactment (role exists, change in incumbent, 
consistent performance)
Role re-definition (role exists, change in 
incumbent, improvised performance)
Radical role re-definition (role exists, change in incumbent, 
fundamental change in performance)
Role invention (role does not exist, new 
incumbent, new performance)
DESCRIBE PERFORMANCE:
General knowledge:
Individual role repertoire
Leadership Worksheet
Leadership role enactment:
Instrumental (describe)--
Expressive (describe)--
Leadership negotiated (describe conflicts or problems 
establishing/maintaining leadership role/s)
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